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The Ouagadougou Declaration and Plan of Action on Accelerating Prison and Penal Reform in 
Africa of 20031 endorsed recommendations calling for reducing the size of prison populations in 
Africa. The Plan of Action recommended the ‘[d]ecriminalisation of some offences such as being 
a rogue and vagabond, loitering, prostitution, failure to pay debts and disobedience to parents’ as 
a strategy to reduce the prison population. More than a decade has passed and few countries have 
made any progress in implementing this strategy endorsed by the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). Many of the offences identified by the ACHPR as ripe for repeal 
amount to nothing more than the criminalisation of poverty, homelessness, and unemployment. 
Certain offences, such as loitering and being a ‘rogue’ and ‘vagabond’, date back to colonial times 
and have no place in Africa anymore. They must be repealed. Their continued enforcement is 
disproportionately experienced by the poor and marginalised populations, including persons with 
disabilities. The existence of these laws, and their enforcement, are justified by proponents with 
unsubstantiated arguments based more on anecdote and bias than fact. Such proponents argue, for 
example, that arresting people for loitering prevents crime and has a deterrent effect on would-be 
criminals. It is similarly argued that arresting street children and persons with intellectual and 
psychosocial disabilities in so-called sweeping operations encourages them to return to their homes 
and families and relieves the public of the burden and inconvenience of such persons. There is no 
evidence to support these claims. 
This paper sets out the arguments and evidence for the decriminalisation and declassification of 
petty offences. In brief, these are as follows: 
• These laws are enforced in a discriminatory manner and frequently result in arbitrary and 
unlawful arrests targeting the poor and other marginalised groups. 
• These laws and their enforcement do not promote public safety and may even be counter-
productive. 
                                                      
1 ACHPR /Res.64 (XXXIV) 03: Resolution on the adoption of the ‘Ouagadougou Declaration and plan of action on 
accelerating prison and penal reform in Africa’ (2003). 




• The enforcement of such laws contributes to the number of people in pre-trial detention and 
thus adds to already overcrowded prisons, which of itself has negative consequences for 
detainees and an adverse socioeconomic impact on their families. 
• The enforcement of such laws is highly discretionary, thus facilitating the extortion of 
bribes, and excessive violence is often associated with arrests. 
• High volumes of arrests for such offences have adverse consequences for police-
community relations.  
Fundamentally we must ask: what is the purpose of these laws and their enforcement? How does 
it contribute to making society safer and what is the evidence for this? These laws and their 
enforcement must also be assessed against key human rights treaties such as the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (AChHPR). It is in particular articles 6 and 7 of the AChHPR that are relevant, protecting 
the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention and the right to a fair trial. More than ten 
years ago the Ouagadougou Declaration already confirmed that these laws and their enforcement 
are an affront to the AChHPR and should be repealed. The AChHPR clearly requires equal 
treatment before the law and in practice; this means that people should not be targeted by the police 
because they are poor and powerless.  
The AChHPR states that every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent 
in a human being and prohibits all forms of exploitation and degradation of man, particularly 
slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment.2  Human 
dignity is a basic right to which all human beings are entitled without discrimination.3 Moreover, 
the AChHPR also prohibits discrimination, amongst other things, based on national and social 
origin and fortune. Targeting poor people for the enforcement of trivial offences may thus amount 
to discrimination based on social origin and fortune. The ACHPR stressed that inhuman and 
degrading treatment includes actions that not only cause serious physical or psychological suffering 
but which humiliate or force the individual against his or her will or conscience.4  Arbitrary 
confrontation by the police and the unlawful arrest of an individual is a demeaning and humiliating 
                                                      
2 Article 5, Organization of African Unity (OAU), African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘Banjul Charter’), 
27 June 1981, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982). 
3 Purohit and Another v The Gambia (2003) AHRLR 96 (ACHPR), para. 57. 
4 Doebbler v Sudan (2003) AHRLR 153 (ACHPR), para. 36.  




experience. This is even more so if it is for a minor offence which is not a threat to public safety 
and which targets vulnerable and poor people. The arbitrary arrest and subsequent detention of 
children in appalling conditions are tantamount to exploitation, and amount to cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment, which is a violation of article 5 of the AChHPR. 
The AChHPR furthermore guarantees everyone the rights to freedom of movement,5 liberty and 
the security of his or her person. In particular, no one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained.6 The 
mere fact that it is an offence to loiter or be a ‘rogue’ and vagabond restricts a person’s freedom of 
movement, while the arbitrary and violent arrest of persons and the extortion of bribes by law 
enforcement officials deny persons all the aforementioned rights and freedoms. 
The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) expressed 
concern that laws which prohibit begging and loitering effectively criminalise homelessness and 
that such laws have a disproportionate effect on vulnerable groups, such as racial and ethnic 
minorities in the United States. 7  Vagrancy and nuisance-related offences are used almost 
exclusively against the poor and marginalised and target persons due to their status in society and 
not because of their actual conduct, or conduct that poses a threat to public safety. 8  
The recently adopted United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) provide targets for 
governments to address extreme poverty.9 Governments have a responsibility to end poverty in all 
its forms everywhere by 2030, particularly by ensuring that all men and women, in particular the 
poor and the vulnerable, have equal rights to economic resources. 10  Governments have a 
responsibility to build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable situations and reduce their 
exposure and vulnerability to economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters. In line with 
                                                      
5 Art. 12(1) AChHPR . 
6 Article 7 of the AChHPR also gives persons the rights: (1) every individual shall have the right to have his cause 
heard. This comprises: (a) the right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts of violating his fundamental 
rights as recognised and guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations and customs in force; (b) the right to be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty by a competent court or tribunal; (c) the right to defence, including the right to be defended 
by counsel of his choice; (d) the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal. (2) No one 
may be condemned for an act or omission which did not constitute a legally punishable offence at the time it was 
committed. No penalty may be inflicted for an offence for which no provision was made at the time it was committed. 
Punishment is personal and can be imposed only on the offender.  
7  The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations (United States), 
CERD/C/USA/CO/7-9, 29 August 2014 at para. 12.  
8 Zimmerman H ‘Louisiana Vagrancy Law – constitutionally sound’ (1969) 29(2) Louisiana Law Review 361, 363. 
9 Sustainable Development Goals, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld. 
10 Goal 1, Sustainable Development Goals. 




the SDGs, as adopted by the UN General Assembly by consensus in September 2015, governments 
must implement programmes and policies to end poverty in all its dimensions and create sound 
policy frameworks based on pro-poor and gender-sensitive development strategies to support 
accelerated investment in poverty-eradication actions.11 Targeting poor and marginalised persons 
for the enforcement of petty and trivial offences is contrary to the SDGs. 
The Protocol to the AChHPR on the Rights of Women in Africa12 (Maputo Protocol) emphasises 
the rights of women to dignity,13  equal protection before the law,14  personal security,15  non-
discrimination16 and all other fundamental freedoms. The Protocol calls on State Parties to: enact 
and effectively implement appropriate legislative or regulatory measures,17 take corrective and 
positive action in those areas where discrimination against women in law and in fact continues to 
exist,18 and support the local, national, regional and continental initiatives directed at eradicating 
all forms of discrimination against women. 19  Arbitrary arrests of women without reasonable 
suspicion of committing an offence, or for being at a specific location at a specific time of the day, 
violate their rights to dignity, equality, non-discrimination and fundamental freedoms. It is a duty 
of State Parties to ensure that such discriminatory practices cease. 
The erratic and arbitrary arrests of street vendors for trying to earn a living wage, based on policies 
to clean up cities, do not support the goal of reducing inequality within a country,20 nor do they 
promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment, and decent 
work for all.21 Such policies do not support the SDGs to end hunger and promote well-being for 
all.22 Governments have a responsibility to make cities and human settlements inclusive and safe,23 
to promote peaceful societies for sustainable development, to provide access to justice for all and 
                                                      
11 Goal 1, Sustainable Development Goals. 
12 African Union, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, 
11 July 2003 (Maputo Protocol). 
13 Art. 3(1) Maputo Protocol. 
14 Art. 8 Maputo Protocol. 
15 Art. 4 Maputo Protocol. 
16 Art. 2 Maputo Protocol. 
17 Art. 2(1)(b) Maputo Protocol. 
18 Art. 2(1)(d) Maputo Protocol. 
19 Art. 2(1)(e) Maputo Protocol. 
20 Goal 10, Sustainable Development Goals. 
21 Goal 8, Sustainable Development Goals. 
22 Goal 2, Sustainable Development Goals. 
23 Goal 11, Sustainable Development Goals. 




to build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.24 Legal and policy reforms 
are needed that aim at limiting, if not ending, arrest and imprisonment for minor offences that do 
not have any effect on public safety. Law enforcement and the criminal justice system cannot 
operate as if they have no impact on poverty and marginalisation. 
This report is divided into four main sections, each exploring a core thematic argument in favour 
of the decriminalisation and declassification of petty offences: 
• Arrests for petty offences are often unlawful and discriminatory, criminalising 
socioeconomic challenges targeting the poor. This section pays particular attention 
to children, sex workers, street traders and the disabled. 
• Arrests for petty offences do not promote public safety and the punishments are 
disproportionate to the offence. 
• The enforcement of petty offences may result in pre-trial detention, adding to prison 
overcrowding. Pre-trial detention, regardless of the offence, has a severe 
socioeconomic impact on poor and marginalised households. 
• The enforcement of petty offences is highly discretionary, frequently associated with 
the use of excessive violence by the police, and open to corruption and bribery. 
It is important to note that in certain instances the arguments in favour of decriminalisation and 
declassification of petty offences focus specifically on these offences and the persons arrested and 
detained under them. However, in other instances, especially as it relates to pre-trial detention and 
its socioeconomic impact, persons detained for petty offences do not form a distinct group as pre-
trial detainees and are by and large treated the same and suffer similar consequences. Nonetheless, 
decriminalisation and declassification may contribute, for example, to reducing prison 
overcrowding and thus the conditions of detention.  
For the purposes of this report it is necessary to reflect briefly on the history of selected petty 
offences, which are also sometimes referred to as ‘outdated offences’.  
                                                      
24 Goal 16, Sustainable Development Goals. 




2 A short history of petty offences  
It is indeed ironic that many of the offences that have remained on the statutes in African countries 
post-independence had as their express purpose the subjugation and humiliation of Africans by 
colonial authorities; however, the main colonising countries (the United Kingdom, France and 
Portugal) have repealed the laws criminalising loitering, begging and so forth, recognising their 
unjustness and problematic enforcement. Whatever the justification was for such laws, such 
justification has disappeared. Nevertheless, some backtracking has occurred in recent years, 
especially in France under a conservative government targeting the Roma people. 
2.1 United Kingdom 
English vagrancy offences date back to 1349 with the Statute of Labourers, which made it an 
offence to give alms to anyone who is able to work.25 Initially, the law was intended to force anyone 
who was able to work to do so due to a severe labour shortage created by the migration of peasants 
to urban areas. In the 1530s the Statute was extended to punish ambiguously defined persons, such 
as ‘someone who is merely idle and gives no reckoning of how he makes his living’ or those 
considered to be ‘rogue[s]’.26 Penalties for the latter offences included having an ear cut off, being 
whipped until bloody, or even facing the death penalty.27  
These laws were eventually codified in the English Vagrancy Act of 1824 (the 1824 Act)28 which 
repealed all previous statutes on the subject, amended the definitions of idle and disorderly persons, 
rogues and vagabonds, and set out powers to search persons and premises.29 The 1824 Act included 
new categories of offences, such as the offences of a kind that only ‘professional’ criminals might 
commit (for example, loitering with intent to commit an arrestable offence) and offences against 
                                                      
25 Southern Africa Litigation Centre (SALC), Centre for Human Rights Education, Advice and Assistance (CHREAA) 
No Justice for the Poor: A Preliminary Study of the Law and Practice Relating to Arrests for Nuisance-Related offences 
in Blantyre, Malawi (2013) 
26 Southern Africa Litigation Centre (SALC), Centre for Human Rights Education, Advice and Assistance (CHREAA) 
No Justice for the Poor: A Preliminary Study of the Law and Practice Relating to Arrests for Nuisance-Related offences 
in Blantyre, Malawi (2013). 
27 Southern Africa Litigation Centre (SALC), Centre for Human Rights Education, Advice and Assistance (CHREAA) 
No Justice for the Poor: A Preliminary Study of the Law and Practice Relating to Arrests for Nuisance-Related offences 
in Blantyre, Malawi (2013). 
28 Banda C & Meerkotter A Examining the Constitutionality of Rogue and Vagabond Offences in Malawi (2014). 
29 Southern Africa Litigation Centre (SALC), Centre for Human Rights Education, Advice and Assistance (CHREAA) 
No Justice for the Poor: A Preliminary Study of the Law and Practice Relating to Arrests for Nuisance-Related offences 
in Blantyre, Malawi (2013). 




public decency and morality (for example, offensive behaviour by prostitutes and indecent 
exposure). 30  The authority of the 1824 Act diminished in Britain over the years as various 
provisions were repealed or refined in line with changing notions of fairness and justice.31 It was 
only recently, in 2003, that the possibility of imprisonment for the remaining offences relating to 
being an idle and disorderly person or rogue and vagabond in Britain was removed.32 
2.2 Mozambique 
In Mozambique, the old Penal Code 33  dating back to 1886 criminalised behaviours such as 
vagrancy and begging. The old Mozambican Penal Code dates back to when Mozambique was a 
Portuguese colony, but after independence it was kept in force by means of article 79 of the 1975 
Constitution.34 Fortunately, these behaviours have now been decriminalised by the new Penal 
Code, which entered into force in June 2015. During colonial times the Portuguese Penal Code 
applied to the colonies and loitering was criminalised in Portugal as well as the colonies. In 
Portugal, these behaviours were decriminalised in 198235 when a new Penal Code entered into 
force.36  
2.3 France 
Until recently French law criminalised several petty offence, including begging and being a 
vagabond. The criminalisation of non-payment of debts was by and large decriminalised in the 
middle of the nineteenth century. The offences of being a vagabond and begging were criminalised 
by sections 269 to 282 of the 1810 Criminal Code. Both carried a penalty of imprisonment of 
between three and six months. A vagabond was defined as anyone without a known address or 
                                                      
30 Southern Africa Litigation Centre (SALC), Centre for Human Rights Education, Advice and Assistance (CHREAA) 
No Justice for the Poor: A Preliminary Study of the Law and Practice Relating to Arrests for Nuisance-Related offences 
in Blantyre, Malawi (2013). 
31 Banda C & Meerkotter A Examining the Constitutionality of Rogue and Vagabond Offences in Malawi (2014). 
32  See Criminal Justice Act, 44 of 2003, Schedule 25, available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/44/schedule/25/2005-03-31. Banda C & Meerkotter A Examining the 
Constitutionality of Rogue and Vagabond Offences in Malawi (2014). 
33 Arts. 49, 256-62. 
34 Reisman L & Lalá A Assessment of Crime and Violence in Mozambique & Recommendations for Violence 
Prevention and Reduction (2012) Johannesburg: Open Society Foundation. 
35 Dias JF ‘As tendências recentes da política criminal e o novo código penal Português de 1982’ (1982) in Fragoso 
HC (ed) Revista de direito penal e criminologia 11. 
36 Dias JF ‘As tendências recentes da política criminal e o novo código penal Português de 1982’ (1982) in Fragoso 
HC (ed) Revista de direito penal e criminologia 11. 




means of subsistence and who did not have employment,37 and until 1832 the state could detain 
vagabonds indefinitely.  
Begging was not defined and was only criminalised if the beggar was begging in an area that had 
a ‘poorhouse’ (dépôt de mendicité), a public institution established to accommodate beggars. The 
beggar would be brought to the poorhouse after having served his or her prison sentence. If there 
was no such institution, only able beggars were to be arrested and sentenced to imprisonment.  
The 1810 Criminal Code was repealed and replaced by the 1994 Criminal Code, in which none of 
these petty offences was reflected. From the 1980s, homelessness was increasingly perceived by 
society as being a socioeconomic issue requiring a response from state social services rather than 
law enforcement.38 
However, post-1995, several municipalities adopted by-laws prohibiting begging – especially in 
tourist areas – which is usually penalised by an administrative fine and not imprisonment. This 
being said, a 2003 Internal Security Act39 was adopted by the (conservative) Sarkozy government 
and is largely regarded as reflecting a willingness by the government to be seen to be tough on 
crime. It creates a series of new offences and changes some conditions of police custody. Two new 
offences in particular can be seen as petty offences. First, the Act criminalises the fact of having 
established permanent or temporary residence in a private or public space. Basically, it criminalises 
Roma people (although large municipalities are obliged to make some terrains available for them), 
who increasingly are being seen by the majority of the population as outcasts. The punishment for 
this offence is six months imprisonment and a fine of €3 750.40 Secondly, the Act re-criminalises 
the act of begging, if committed aggressively or with a ‘dangerous animal’, and carries a sentence 
of six months imprisonment and a fine of €3 750.41 
3 Key concepts 
Arrest: Arrest is understood to mean the following, as per Holgate-Mohammed v Duke:  
                                                      
37 Section 270. 
38 Damon J « La prise en charge des vagabonds, des mendiants et des clochards : une histoire en mouvement » (2007) 
43(6) Revue de droit sanitaire et social 933-51. 
39 Loi du 18 mars 2003 pour la sécurité intérieure. 
40 New section 322-4-1 of the Criminal Code. 
41 New section 312-12-1 of the Criminal Code. 




First, it should be noted that arrest is a continuing act; it starts with the arrester taking a person 
into his custody (sc. by action or words restraining him from moving anywhere beyond the 
arrester’s control), and it continues until the person so restrained is either released from 
custody or, having been brought before a magistrate, is remanded in custody by the 
magistrate’s judicial act.42 
Bail: The temporary release of an accused person from prison pending trial, sometimes on 
condition that a sum of money be paid to the Court to guarantee the accused person’s appearance 
in court.  
Bond: A written and signed promise to pay a certain sum of money on a certain date, or on 
fulfilment of a specified condition. For the purpose of this paper, a bond can secure the accused 
person’s temporary release from prison pending trial.  
By-laws: For the purposes of this report, these refer to laws made by a local government, such as a 
municipality, metropolitan authority or county.  
Child’s best interests: In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private 
social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best 
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.43 When adults make decisions, they should 
think about how their decisions will affect children. Governments must ensure the child such 
protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and 
duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her, 
and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures and ensure that 
the institutions, services and facilities responsible for the care or protection of children conform 
with the standards established by competent authorities, particularly in the areas of safety, health, 
in the number and suitability of their staff, as well as competent supervision.44 
Declassification: This can happen in a number of ways. Even if an offence is not decriminalised, 
enforcement is curtailed through a number of mechanisms, such as prohibiting arrest for the offence 
(that is, the offence is classified as a non-arrestable offence and the person is warned) or requiring 
a certain number of warnings (over a specified period of time) before a person can be arrested. 
                                                      
42 [1984] AC 437, [1984] 1 All ER 1054, [1984] 2 WLR 660. 
43 Art. 3(1) Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
44 Art. 3(3) Convention on the Rights of the Child. 




Declassification may also mean that an arrested person may not be detained awaiting trial for the 
offence and that transgressions must be summarily dealt with. Declassification may also mean 
prohibiting a sentence of imprisonment for the offence, making the offences an administrative 
offence instead and allowing diversion as an option for the offence. 
Decriminalise: This refers to the process of removing an act that was criminal and its associated 
penalties from the statutes. 
Disability: This is the consequence of an impairment that may be physical, cognitive, mental, 
sensory, emotional, developmental, or some combination of these.45 Impairment is a problem in 
body function or structure; an activity limitation is a difficulty encountered by an individual in 
executing a task or action; while a participation restriction is a problem experienced by an 
individual in involvement in life situations.46 
Disability rights: These refer to the rights of a person with disabilities and the obligations imposed 
on State Parties as contained in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities;47 such 
rights do not exclude the human rights contained in all other binding international treaties, rights 
to which all persons have the same entitlement.  
Discrimination: This refers to any act or omission, including a policy, law, rule, practice, condition 
or situation caused by the state, private person or juristic person which directly or indirectly - (a) 
imposes burdens, obligations or disadvantage on; or (b) withholds benefits, opportunities or 
advantages from, any person on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, 
marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, 
conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.48 
Fair trial rights: The right to a fair trial is a peremptory norm of customary international law49 and 
is enshrined in article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 
Articles 9, 10 and 15 of the ICCPR inform the content of fair trial rights and establish that: 
                                                      
45 World Health Organisation: Health Topics – Disabilities. Available at: http://www.who.int/topics/disabilities/en/. 
46 World Health Organisation: Health Topics – Disabilities. Available at: http://www.who.int/topics/disabilities/en/. 
47 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: resolution/adopted by the General 
Assembly, 24 January 2007, A/RES/61/106.  
48 Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 and section 9(3) and (4) of the 
Constitution of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
49  A peremptory norm is a fundamental principle from which no derogation is permitted. UN Human Rights 
Committee, General Comment 29, States of Emergency (article 4), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001), and UN Human 




• Arrested or detained persons must be brought promptly before a judicial officer and 
be entitled to a trial within a reasonable time or to release; 
• It must not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial are detained in custody, but 
release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial; 
• There must be a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal;  
• There must be equality before the courts and tribunals;  
• There must not be arbitrary detention;  
• There must be restriction of the use of incommunicado detention;  
• Detainees have access to lawyers, doctors and family; and  
• There is independent internal and external oversight over places of detention.50 
Violations of the right to a fair trial are likely to exacerbate the socioeconomic impact on detainees 
and their associated households. On the other hand, while strict adherence to fair trial rights may 
work to limit the negative socioeconomic impact of pre-trial detention, some impact is likely to 
occur even when fair trial rights have been observed. There is thus an argument that there is a duty 
to take into account socioeconomic rights beyond adherence to fair trial rights. 
Impunity: The UN Commission on Human Rights defines impunity as the impossibility, de jure or 
de facto, of bringing the perpetrators of violations to account – whether in criminal, civil, 
administrative or disciplinary proceedings – since they are not subject to any inquiry that might 
lead to their being accused, arrested, tried and, if found guilty, sentenced to appropriate penalties, 
and to making reparations to their victims.51 
                                                      
Rights Committee, General Comment 32: Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, 
CCPR/C/GC/32 (23 August 2007), [54]. 
50 UN General Assembly Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Question of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, A/56/156, 3 July 2001, [34]. Articles 6 and 7 of the AChHPR reflect ICCPR 
safeguards, and the ACHPR has provided further guidance on the content of the right to fair treatment in the Resolution 
on the Right to Recourse and Fair Trial (Res.4 (XI) 92) and the Principles and Guidelines on Rights to a Fair Trial and 
Legal Assistance in Africa (see also Rights International v Nigeria, African Commission on Human and Peoples 
Rights, Communication no. 215/98, [29]).  
51 E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 Definitions. This definition differs slightly from the one adopted in 1996 
(E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/18) by adding the words ‘if found guilty, sentenced to appropriate penalties, and to making 
reparations to their victims’. 




Impunity therefore implies a political and social context in which laws against human rights 
violations are either ignored or perpetrators inadequately punished by the state.52 
Petty offence: There is no generally accepted definition of what a petty offence is, but it is perhaps 
best measured as relative to the sanction that may be imposed and the response from the state. 
Some petty offences may attract a term of imprisonment, which is by no means trivial. Such 
offences are usually also heard by the lowest order of court or a specialised court, such as a 
municipal court (for by-law offences) or traffic courts (for traffic offences). For example, under 
English common law and American federal law, petty offences are usually punishable by a 
relatively small fine and/or a short term of imprisonment. There is also a summary trial and the 
accused is not entitled to a trial by jury.53 A petty offence, in principle, does not pose a serious 
threat to societal safety, any individuals or property.  
Poverty: The term ‘absolute poverty’ generally refers to a specific income threshold or a fixed 
amount below which individuals are unable to meet basic needs. By international standards, it is a 
‘state in which a family earns less than a minimum amount of income – typically US$1.25 per day 
per person in low-income countries’. In relative terms, individuals are considered poor when their 
financial position compares unfavourably with an average living standard in society – what the 
United Nations describes as the ‘inability of individuals, households, families, or entire 
communities to attain a minimum and socially accepted standard of living’. Relative poverty may 
also refer to the lowest income level of a society, that is, the portion of a population that earns the 
least. This creates a completely different characterisation of poverty: though absolute poverty may 
be eliminated as incomes grow, there will always be a lowest-earning group in any population and 
always a degree of relative poverty.54 
Socioeconomic impact: This report uses the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) as a basic framework for understanding the socioeconomic status of 
individuals and their households, incorporating at least the following rights: 
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• The right to equality between men and women to pursue economic, social and cultural 
rights (art. 3); 
• The right to work and the duty of the state to take measures (for example, training 
programmes) to enable people to access gainful employment (art. 6); 
• The right to just conditions of employment (art. 7); 
• The right to social security (art. 9); 
• The duty of the state to provide the widest possible protection to the family (art. 10); 
• The right to an adequate standard of living and to be free from hunger (art. 11); 
• The right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health 
(art. 12); 
• The right to education (art. 13). 
The nature of the obligations on states set out by the ICESCR is not that states must ensure that 
every person has employment, social security, and the like, but rather that states should ‘respect’, 
‘protect’ and ‘promote’ these socioeconomic rights. The duty to ‘respect’ entails an obligation not 
to interfere with the resources of individuals, their freedom to find a job, their freedom to take 
necessary action and to use their resources to satisfy needs. This report argues that arrest and 
detention for petty offences is a disproportionate, unnecessary and avoidable interference in 
people’s lives and thus their ability to attain socioeconomic well-being. 
Surety: It is a promise by a surety (guarantor) to pay one party (the obligee) a certain amount if a 
second party (the principal) fails to meet his or her obligation to pay in terms of a contract.  




4 Arrests for petty offences are often unlawful, discriminatory and criminalise 
socioeconomic challenges, thus targeting the poor and marginalised 
4.1 Legal framework and challenges 
The ICCPR guarantees everyone the equal enjoyment of civil and political rights contained in the 
Covenant,55 the right to liberty and security of person,56 and the right not to be subjected to arbitrary 
arrest or detention.57 The deprivation of liberty must be done in accordance with a procedure 
established by law.58 All persons deprived of their liberty must be treated with humanity and with 
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.59 Regionally, everyone is entitled to the 
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms under the AChHPR without distinction of any kind, such as 
race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social 
origin, fortune, birth or other status.60 State Parties to the AChHPR have an obligation to ensure 
the elimination of discrimination against women, and the protection of the rights of woman and 
children, as stipulated in international declarations and conventions.61  
The ACHPR Guidelines on the Use and Conditions of Arrest, Police Custody and Pre-trial 
Detention in Africa (the Luanda Guidelines) provide that people shall be deprived of their liberty 
only on the basis of laws that are clear, precise and consistent with international standards and 
respect for the rights of the individual. 62  Arrests may not be carried out on the basis of 
discrimination of any kind.63 In some African countries, the police are allowed wide discretion to 
arrest people based on petty offence laws that are often vaguely defined or overly broad. In some 
cases, petty offences provide a tool for the police to arrest persons whom they think are engaging 
in or planning criminal conduct under circumstances when a charge under a substantive charge or 
offence cannot be supported.64 Arrests are frequently unlawful as they do not meet the requirements 
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of having reasonable suspicion, assessing all the elements of the crime, and having an open mind 
to the guilt or innocence of the suspect. Further, the evidentiary requirements for an offence such 
as loitering or being a rogue or vagabond are uncertain, and people are convicted for such offences 
essentially based on the oral evidence of the arresting officer or an admission of guilt in order to 
bring the matter to a close. 
Police officials have considerable discretion to arrest, especially when detection is dependent on 
police action.65 For example, the enforcement of loitering offences is notorious in this regard, as it 
is an offence of questionable validity and highly dependent on who individual police officers define 
as persons eligible for arrest.66 Non-judicial factors also play a role. A US study on arrest rates for 
public drunkenness provides a good example of the role of non-judicial factors. The study isolated 
three variables that will increase the risk of arrest where there is significant discretion at play.67  
First, the offence conspicuousness – is the person drunk in a place where he is visible to the public 
and the police, or is it out of the ‘public eye’? The more visible the offence (for example, 
drunkenness), the higher the chance of arrest. Secondly, the more powerless the offender is, the 
higher the likelihood of arrest. Being powerless should be understood in the sense that the arrest, 
if unlawful, holds risks for the arresting officer in the form of media attention, disciplinary action 
or litigation. Thirdly, the more disrespectful the offender is to the police officer, the more likely it 
is that he or she will be arrested, although being disrespectful to a police officer is not a criminal 
offence. It is notable that the three variables (conspicuousness, powerlessness and disrespect) are 
all non-legal in nature but play an important role in how the arresting officer exercises his 
discretion. Whether this analysis fits the African context requires further research, but it may be a 
useful starting-point.68  
There is a substantial body of evidence from Europe and North America that ethnic and racial 
minorities are at significantly higher risk for stop and search and consequently arrest.69 In the 
African context, it appears that ethnic minorities are at a higher risk of arrest and ultimately pre-
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trial detention than was found to be the case in Kenya,70 Malawi71 and Zambia.72 Although it is not 
certain whether ethnicity plays a role, certain groups such as homeless persons, street children, 
persons with psychosocial and intellectual disabilities, intoxicated and drug-affected persons, street 
vendors and sex workers in particular contexts are evidently disproportionally targets for arrests 
for petty offence such as loitering, nuisance, being a rogue and vagabond, and other minor 
municipal offences.73  
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (AChRWC) guarantees the child a host 
of rights. Prosecuting the child on the basis of his or her ‘homelessness’ is in violation of the non-
discrimination clause in the AChRWC.74 Moreover, the detention of a child for being homeless is 
not in line with the principle of the best interests of the child.75 State Parties should ensure to the 
maximum extent the protection and development of children.76 The detention of children for petty 
vagrancy offences does not promote their development, leisure recreation and cultural activities77 
as they are confined to places of detention or prisons. Nor does the detention of children in 
appalling conditions protect their right to health.78 The abuse of children in detention and their 
detention under inexcusable conditions are tantamount to inhuman or degrading treatment and a 
violation of article 16 of the AChRWC and article 16 of UNCAT. Such treatment is also not in line 
with article 17(1) of the AChRWC, which guarantees  
children accused or found guilty of having infringed a penal law the right to special treatment 
in a manner consistent with the child's sense of dignity and worth and which reinforces the 
child's respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of others. 
Moreover, article 17(2)(a)-(b) of the AChRWC requires State Parties to ensure that children 
deprived of their liberty are not subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
and are detained separately from adults in detention. State Parties have an obligation to protect 
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children against sexual exploitation.79 Sexual abuse and exploitation of children in detention by 
officials after arrests for minor offences violates the state’s duty under article 27 of the AChRWC. 
Where it is found that children are forced to work in prisons, this is not in compliance with article 
15 of the AChRWC which requires every child to be protected from ‘all forms of economic 
exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the 
child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral, or social development’. State Parties have an obligation 
to take special care of refugee children80 and children separated from their parents.81 Instead of 
arresting homeless and refugee children for vagrancy offences, State Parties have a duty to reunite 
them with their families and ensure their physical and mental well-being and development.  
The above issues are explored further in the remainder of this section. 
4.2 Arresting children  
Children who spend time on the street are frequent targets of police arrests, especially those living 
and working in public spaces. A number of report document the arbitrary arrest and abuse of 
children by police officials for various petty offences. Rounding up street children when dignitaries 
visit or prior to major events (for example, the 2010 Soccer World Cup in South Africa)82 is also 
not unheard of. In respect of the DRC, Human Rights Watch reports that roundups of street children 
are likely to occur when crimes happen in areas where such children are known to congregate, the 
victims of the crime are politically connected or when considerable amounts of money or goods 
were taken.83  
A 2012 research report documents that there were more than 150 children in conflict with the law 
in South Sudan’s prisons84 and that few services were available to them.85 They were removed 
from their families and from school to await trial for extended periods, and sometimes given long 
sentences for petty offences such as low-value theft.86 There are no alternatives to imprisonment 
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in South Sudan, and in all the prisons Human Rights Watch visited, children were housed alongside 
adults; a child as young as 13 years was found in prison, even though domestic law allows 
imprisonment only from the age of 16 years.87  
In Kenya, there have been many incidents of street children being arrested and detained for loitering 
and other vagrancy offences.88 Research conducted by Human Rights Watch89 finds that street 
children in Kenya are subject to frequent arrest simply because they are homeless. ‘Vagrancy’ 
(being without a fixed abode) is a criminal offence under Kenyan law. Children reported that on 
the street they are often harassed and beaten by police, and have to pay bribes in order to avoid 
arrest for vagrancy.90 Female street children reported being sexually propositioned or raped by 
police in order to avoid arrest or to be released from custody.91 Twenty-five out of 45 children 
interviewed after being arrested said they had been beaten by police at the time of arrest and/or at 
the police station.92 Once arrested, street children were held in deplorable physical conditions in 
crowded police station cells, often without toilets or bedding, with little food and inadequate 
supplies of water. They are almost always mixed with adults, beaten and harassed by police at the 
station, and held for periods extending from several days to weeks without any review of the 
legality of their detention by judicial authorities.93  
Street children in Uganda also face abuse and arbitrary arrest.94 Police and officials threaten them 
at night and beat them with batons, whips or wires to extort bribes or as a punishment for 
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vagrancy.95 Children have sometimes been detained in police stations with adults and mistreated 
by cellmates. Many were released back to the streets after several days, or in some cases weeks, 
often only after paying a bribe or being forced to do work for the police.96 In Malawi in March 
2012 more than 30 children were arrested in Kasungu, Malawi, for ‘loitering around town without 
proper reasons’,97 and in June 2013 Malawian police arrested 47 people aged 14 to 40 years for 
loitering in Balaka town in an effort ‘to curb criminal activities’.98  
Research in Egypt clearly indicates targeted arrest campaigns against children by the police. The 
director of Cairo Governorate Police Directorate’s al Azbekiya juvenile lockup, Brigadier Yasir 
Abu Shahdi, gave his interpretation of these arrest powers:  
“We arrest kids in parks who look like they are homeless. We arrest kids selling 
tissues in the street. These kids become known to us, so it isn’t hard. [Sometimes] 
we arrest kids walking down the street during school hours with their school books, 
but I don’t have enough officers to make as many of these arrests as I would like. I 
am asking for more officers, because in the future we want to conduct campaigns to 
search for and arrest truants.” While some of these arrests involve small numbers of 
children, more often they take the form of arrest campaigns involving tens of 
children in a targeted neighbourhood. “Our daily work is to gather up children from 
the streets and arrest any who are in violation of the law,” Abu Shahdi said. “[In 
contrast,] the arrest campaigns last three or four days and are more specialized. For 
example, if we learn that the number of children who sell tissues in a particular 
neighbourhood has increased, I conduct a campaign in that neighbourhood.”99 
There is no substantive evidence that children commit a disproportionate amount of crime. Instead 
of arresting children for petty offences, governments have a duty to ensure to the maximum extent 
possible their protection and development.100  
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4.3 The arbitrary arrest of poor and vulnerable persons for petty crimes such as loitering, 
vagrancy, being a rogue and vagabond, being a public nuisance, and public 
drunkenness 
This section shows that there is ample evidence of arbitrary and unlawful arrests targeting poor 
persons. Incidents are also reported of police arrests of street vendors as well as women being 
rounded up by police officials, detained and/or charged unlawfully under public nuisance or 
vagrancy laws as a means to punish them for alleged sex work. 
A 2008 report from Kenya noted that in the poorest areas, the police methodically undertook night 
patrols, rounding up poor people, women, hawkers and street children. They then proceeded with 
mass arrests for disparate charges such as drunkenness, disorderliness, prostitution, vagrancy or 
simply the suspicion of being an illegal alien.101 Those who were arrested were unable to access 
legal assistance as they lacked financial means and/or because they were unaware of their rights.  
While not all pre-trial detainees are charged with petty offences, the overwhelming impression is 
that it is the poor who end up in prison. In 2007, a survey conducted by the Independent Medico-
Legal Unit (IMLU) confirmed that the majority of those serving prison sentences in Kenya were 
the poorest and most economically disadvantaged, and were more commonly individuals with 
lower levels of education who were less aware of their rights.102 The data illustrated that the ability 
to obtain legal services is low for all categories; even amongst those employed, only 34.3 per cent 
were able to obtain legal assistance.103 The cost of legal services are beyond the financial abilities 
of ordinary Kenyans. The research also found that the lower the level of education of the detainee, 
the less likely it is that there will be an application for bail.104 Poor people arrested for petty 
offences will not have the means to access legal representation in order to challenge the charge, 
and their detention results in continued detention even if they are eligible for conditional release. 
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The deliberate practice by the Rwanda National Police of rounding up ‘undesirable’ people and 
arbitrarily detaining them at an unofficial detention centre (known as Gikondo Transit Centre) in 
Kigali has been documented by Human Rights Watch.105 Reports indicate that there was no lawful 
basis for depriving the majority of the detainees of their liberty, and no judicial process or oversight 
mechanism regulating their detention.106  The research, conducted between 2011 and 2015 in 
Kigali, also describes human rights abuses at the centre that holds street children, street vendors, 
sex workers, homeless people, suspected petty criminals and suspected serious offenders.107 The 
majority of those detained were poor, homeless or otherwise marginalised or vulnerable who were 
arbitrarily rounded up by the police.108  
From Kenya there are recent reports that high numbers of arrests of Muslim refugees and asylum 
seekers for loitering are common in Kenya after attacks by Al Shabaab militants.109 Ethnic profiling 
in relation to terrorism following the Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi in 2014 has emerged as a 
trend. Somali refugees were rounded up and returned to refugee camps, and similar tactics are 
reportedly used in the Mombasa area where the police, searching for Al Shabaab fighters, are 
targeting Muslims.110 The overall impression is that petty offence laws are used to target people 
regarded as ‘undesirable’ and unwanted, not because they pose a threat to public safety, but rather 
because they are powerless and ‘do not belong’. 
In Malawi, a court expressed concern that the charge of being a rogue and vagabond could be used 
to oppress disadvantaged persons who are not criminals. The court stated that the reality is that 
many persons in a developing country have no visible means of subsistence, and an offence that 
requires proof of subsistence to avoid arrest invariably discriminates against the poor and 
marginalised groups within society.111  
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4.4 Arresting sex workers under loitering and public nuisance offences 
Sex workers are often the target for arbitrary arrest by law enforcement officials. Vagrancy-related 
offences such as loitering and being a rogue or vagabond are used to arrest them. These laws allow 
police wide discretion to arrest persons, even where the conduct of the accused does not meet the 
legal requirements of having reasonable suspicion and without police officials having to assess all 
the elements of the crime. Such arrests are often carried out on a discriminatory basis, since many 
police officials view sex work as immoral and/or undesirable even if it is not criminal. In Malawi, 
the police often use vagrancy laws to arrest women suspected of being sex workers112 in terms of 
section 184(c) of the Penal Code, which states that  
every person found in or upon or near any premises or in any road or highway or any place 
adjacent thereto or in any public place at such time and under such circumstances as to lead 
to the conclusion that such person is there for an illegal or disorderly purpose, is deemed a 
rogue and vagabond.113  
Such arrests are executed using rogue and vagabond offences under the penal code because of the 
difficulty of producing evidence for charging sex workers with sex work-specific offences.114 
Women and Law in Southern Africa (WLSA) in Malawi found that many arrests and convictions 
under section 184(c) are irregular: that is, the alleged actions of the women simply did not 
correspond to the definition of a crime under section 184(c).115 
A 2008 study conducted by the Federation of Women Lawyers in Kenya documents the arbitrary, 
unlawful and discriminatory practices of police of arresting and detaining women suspected of 
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loitering for immoral purposes based on mere observation of how the women dress, talk or walk.116 
In Kenya, for example, two women were arrested and detained in police custody on the allegation 
that they had committed the offence of ‘loitering in a public place for immoral purposes contrary 
to section 258 (m) of the Mombasa Municipal by-laws’.117 They alleged that the police officers 
who arrested them had no search warrant and had no reason or basis to arrest them; when arrested 
they were not preparing to commit, nor were they in the process of committing, any cognisable 
offence.118 Reportedly, the police officers who arrested them ‘expressly told them that they were 
in possession of condoms [and] that they thought there was an offence being committed’.119  
In this case, the Kenyan government’s response is perplexing. First, the government argued that 
they were charged under the General Nuisance by-law,120 which provides:  
any person who shall in any street or public place [m] loiter or importune for the purposes of 
prostitution [n] procure or attempt to procure a female or male for the purpose of prostitution 
or homosexuality shall be guilty of an offence.121  
Secondly, the government justified that the by-law’s benefit ‘by far outweighs the alleged narrow 
interest of the petitioners ... it is aimed at prohibiting prostitution’ and ‘the by-law strikes a balance 
between the rights of the petitioners and the rights and values of the citizenry living in the 
Municipality.’122 Lastly, the deponent described prostitution as ‘a vice, which aids and abets the 
spread of HIV/AIDS, and is used as a medium for sexual exploitation by perverts and 
paedophiles.’123  
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The arguments presented by the government outline the supposed moral and safety concerns 
presented around sex work, which in themselves are problematic, but fail to address the legal merits 
of whether the women’s conduct was unlawful. In other words, they fail to address whether the 
women’s ‘loitering’ was indeed for the purpose of prostitution, as required by the by-laws.  
Sex workers are almost universally harassed by the police and suffer frequent arrests and adverse 
treatment;124 more than a quarter of sex workers surveyed in a 2008 study in Cape Town were 
extorted for sex in exchange for release from custody.125 Of 80 sex workers surveyed in 2013 in 
Johannesburg, 15 per cent said they had been arrested, with 10 per cent stating that they were held 
in cells without appearing in court.126 Even off-duty sex workers in Cape Town are routinely 
arrested by the police.127 Similar findings were also reported from Malawi, with coercion, violence 
and rape being perpetrated against sex workers.128 
The above describes the exploitative and discriminatory law enforcement tactics employed by 
police officials to arrest and detain women they suspect of prostitution.129 It is also an example of 
the wide discretion afforded to police officials to arrest without a warrant and the adverse 
consequences thereof. The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol) emphasises women’s rights to dignity,130 equal 
protection before the law, 131  security of the person, 132  non-discrimination 133  and all other 
fundamental freedoms. It calls on State Parties to: enact and effectively implement appropriate 
legislative or regulatory measures;134 take corrective and positive action in those areas where 
discrimination against women in law and in fact continues to exist;135  and support the local, 
national, regional and continental initiatives directed at eradicating all forms of discrimination 
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against women.136 Arbitrary arrests of women without reasonable suspicion of committing an 
offence or for being at a specific location at a specific time, violate their rights to dignity, equality, 
non-discrimination and fundamental freedoms set forth in the AChHPR and the Maputo 
Protocol.137 It is the duty of State Parties to ensure that such discriminatory practices cease.  
4.5 Arresting street traders for violating municipal by-laws  
Street trade accounts for a significant proportion of informal non-agricultural employment in 
Africa.138 Many street vendors are poor, selling their products and produce to earn a livelihood. 
Rakodi defines a livelihood as comprising ‘the capabilities, assets (including both material and 
social resources) and activities required for a means of living’.139 Authors identify access to public 
space as a key physical asset in the livelihood strategies of the urban poor.140  The arbitrary 
enforcement of such by-laws on street vendors clearly results in social exclusion of street traders, 
generally poor people.141 A 2013 International Labour Organization (ILO) report indicates that in 
the sub-Saharan African countries for which data were available, informal sector trading employs 
the most people and women account for the majority employed in this sector.142 For many women 
the informal sector is the only means of generating an income.  
The report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights analysed several laws, 
regulations and practices that punish, segregate, control and undermine the autonomy of persons 
living in poverty.143 In the report, the Special Rapporteur identifies the following four areas of 
concern: (a) laws, regulations and practices which unduly restrict the performance of life-sustaining 
behaviours in public spaces by persons living in poverty; (b) urban planning regulations and 
measures related to the gentrification and privatisation of public spaces that disproportionately 
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impact persons living in poverty; (c) requirements and conditions imposed on access to public 
services and social benefits which interfere with the autonomy, privacy and family life of persons 
living in poverty; and (d) excessive and arbitrary use of detention and incarceration that threatens 
the liberty and personal security of persons living in poverty. 
Informal sector work in Kenya, such as hawking, street trade and other casual labour, constitutes 
an important economic source for the poorest of society. However, restrictive by-laws on urban 
trading dating back to colonial times make traders fair game for police harassment, arrest, extortion 
as well as excessive use of force.144 In the city of Nairobi, Kenya, there are provisions for street-
trading, but the General Nuisance By-Law is often used to override these provisions.145  The 
General Nuisance By-Law was created during the colonial administration and allows city 
inspectors to arrest any individual that they deem is creating a ‘general nuisance’ in public 
spaces.146  
Inspectors in Nairobi, known as ‘askaris’, use this by-law to chase street vendors off the streets. 
The askaris are the same authority responsible for issuing street vendor licences.147 Despite the 
fact that many Kenyans find their daily livelihoods and subsistence in a variety of informal 
economic activities,148 street vendors and traders are often the target of erratic law enforcement 
and arrest by the police or askaris either because street vending is illegal or because street vendors 
are not permitted to trade in a specific area due to by-laws restricting such activities. The mere fact 
that street vendors pay their daily or annual licensing fee does not protect them from the askaris, 
as it is a common occurrence for the city’s askaris to come around to vendors’ sites and demand a 
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substantial fee even when street vendors have already paid their licensing fees.149  Moreover, 
submitting to the askaris’ unlawful demands by paying them is seen as a less expensive alternative, 
because if a street vendor is arrested and brought before a court of law, the process of pleading not 
guilty is too expensive for the vendor and vendors often have no choice but to plead guilty. Pleading 
guilty means they can get out of the judicial system faster and return to their businesses but their 
confiscated stock is not returned and vendors cannot ask for their stock for fear of reprisal, such as 
being detained again.150 
The Kenyan National Commission on Human Rights has observed that violence against informal 
sector workers is an unresolved issue that needs to be adequately addressed.151 In addition to other 
forms of torture and other ill treatment152 suffered by street traders in Nairobi, police shootings in 
2014 accounted for the bulk of injuries inflicted on hawkers and small-scale business operators 
there.153  It should be emphasised that these excesses are perpetrated in the course of by-law 
enforcement and not in pursuit of arresting dangerous criminals posing a serious threat to public 
safety. 
There have been reports of brutal assaults and deaths of street vendors by the city’s askari officials 
who are reported to operate with impunity.154 Some of these are documented below. 
• On 13 September 2014 a street vendor had passed out due to the pain caused by a broken 
shin bone, internal injuries, fractured ribs caused by a mob-style beating. He woke up four 
days later. He explained that askaris ‘grabbed me and started battering with clubs and 
knives as one of them repeatedly kicked my lower leg with his boots … The last thing I 
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remember hearing was “Wewe hakuna mahali tunakupeleka, tutakumaliza hapa” (“We are 
not taking you anywhere, we will kill you here”),’ he recalls.155 
• Another street vendor reported that he had just opened his shop around 16h30 to cash in on 
the high traffic of people leaving work when askaris suddenly appeared. They clobbered 
him with metal bars and forced him into their vehicle and drove off. They dumped him 
along a road, taking his phone and the money he had made that day. The attack left him 
with a broken right arm and a broken finger on his right hand. He was undergoing 
physiotherapy to enable him to use his finger.156 
• Joseph Maina, a hawker, was selling socks around Khoja roundabout on 10 April 2014 
when a County government van full of askaris pounced on hawkers. As he attempted to 
flee, he heard two gunshots and then felt a sharp pain in his body before he passed out. His 
medical examination report filed at the Kenya Police on 10 November 2014 indicates that 
the bullet fired at him by a police officer ‘entered his body from the back through his 
shoulder blade exiting through his left orbital cavity’. The bullet shattered his eyeball, 
leaving him blind in one eye. He says this information was filed seven months after he had 
been led around in circles by police. Worse, his attempts to find justice one year later have 
been futile.157 
• In another case, Mr. Gathece was cornered by county askaris at the New Ngara market at 
a section known as Tsunami. Askaris started attacking everyone in sight and Mr. Gathece 
tripped as he was running and fell. A witness said that the askaris ‘descended on him with 
machetes and knives, leaving him seriously wounded. We rushed him to the nearby Guru 
Nanak Hospital where they tried to stabilise him before transferring him to Kenyatta but he 
was pronounced dead on arrival.’  
• Kimani was selling stockings when a County van with City askaris backed by regular police 
officers ambushed them. A post-mortem examination by the Independent Medical Legal 
Unit shows that a bullet, which entered his body from the back, penetrated his liver. 
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However, the City Inspectorate denied that its officers, tasked with maintaining law and 
order, are breaking the same laws they are supposed to uphold.158 
The most recent case is the hacking to death of the street hawkers’ leader in a city hotel, directly 
implicating four city department askaris.159 This incident puts into sharp question whether the 
leader was killed to cover up other senseless killings of hawkers.160 Apparently, the same officers 
have been widely mentioned by victims as part of a team that has been using machetes, knives, 
iron bars, broken bottles and stones to brutalise street vendors since last year.161 
Reports from other countries where unemployment, poverty and conflict are rife allude to similar 
practices. 162  In Rwanda, an illegal street vendor committed suicide in 2012 by public self-
immolation after being repeatedly abused by Local Defence Forces.163 On the day he committed 
suicide, the Local Defence Forces beat him and confiscated his goods. Reports by several 
impoverished local residents indicated that such abuse by Local Defence Forces is 
commonplace.164 Two years earlier the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi on 17 December 
2010 was the spark that started the revolution in Tunisia.165 Reportedly, Bouazizi was a struggling 
street vendor who set himself alight after a local official confiscated his vegetable cart and 
humiliated him in public. Whether he refused to pay bribes or committed suicide for other reasons, 
the struggle of this young man from a poor family struck a chord with many Tunisians and started 
the uprising which led to the fall of the authoritarian regime of President Ben Ali.  
Reports from Kampala, Uganda, indicate that the government intends to put a stop to street 
trading,166 arguing that street trading is a frequently unhygienic form of economic activity as it 
generates excessive litter that the local municipalities have to clean up. It is also said that street 
traders crowd pavements, creating traffic problems.167 Such policies are typical of a government’s 
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heavy-handed policy against the poor and marginalised, one that has lost touch with its people and 
their basic needs. Furthermore, in Kampala in June 2014 a magistrate convicted and sentenced 13 
hawkers to one month imprisonment for selling foodstuffs and other merchandise on Kampala’s 
streets. 168  Law enforcement of this nature is counter-developmental and is a destructive 
infringement of people’s right to maintain a livelihood. Solutions to these problems rather lie in 
the domain of suitable regulation, the creation of supportive infrastructure and other services aimed 
at addressing multi-sectoral concerns. 
There have been recent media reports of the abuse of power by police on street vendors in 
Zimbabwe.169 According to Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, the municipal police launched 
pre-dawn raids on vendors’ booths near the Rezende Street parkade.170 This occurred a day after 
the new local government Minister vowed to act tough on street traders.171 There have also been 
reports from Zimbabwe of street vendors kept in custody with substantial delays in their bail 
hearings, in violation of their constitutional right to an urgent determination of their bail 
application.172  
Human Rights Watch confirmed in 2015 that police in Harare were carrying out violent 
crackdowns on unlicensed street vendors which were characterised by beatings, destruction of 
goods and arbitrary arrests on apparent trumped-up charges of public violence.173 It was also 
reported that the majority of the street vendors were women living in extreme poverty, part of the 
more than 70 per cent of Zimbabweans who live on less than US$1.25 per day.174 Dewa Mavhinga, 
a senior Africa researcher at Human Rights Watch, reported the following in response to the 
situation concerning street vendors: ‘[P]olice harassment and arrests of street vendors [have] 
rapidly escalated in recent weeks since the Harare City Council launched its clean-up campaign.’175 
He reiterated that ‘the lack of a vending license is no grounds for beating and jailing people who 
are desperate to earn a living’.176 
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Reports from Angola indicate that the government also plans to enforce laws banning street 
trading.177 Street vendors will be subject to fines of up to 50 per cent of the value of the goods they 
are selling, while punishments for those who buy from them would follow.178 Human Rights Watch 
reported in 2013 on police abuses against street vendors in Angola.179 Known as Zungeiras (from 
the word ‘Zunga’, which in the Kimbundu language means ‘to move around’), these traders are 
among the country’s poorest and most vulnerable citizens, many of them refugees to the capital 
during the Angolan civil war. Most are female (many with children), illiterate, have no identity 
documents, lack access to basic government services, and live in informal settlements without legal 
protection.180 Seventy-three street vendors were interviewed in Luanda by Human Rights Watch 
and described how police officers and government inspectors, often in civilian clothes without 
identification, seized their goods, extorted bribes, threatened them with imprisonment, and in some 
cases arrested them during operations to force them off the streets.181  
The arrest of street vendors for trying to making a living is effectively the criminalisation of poverty 
and targets the only available means to an income. The AChHPR guarantees that ‘every individual 
shall have the right to work under equitable and satisfactory conditions, and shall receive equal pay 
for equal work’.182  Furthermore, the ICESCR provides everyone the right to work,183  to just 
conditions of employment,184 and to equality between men and women to pursue economic, social 
and cultural rights.185 The targeting of street vendors, infliction of violence and accompanying 
extortion of bribes deny them this right and further limit their economic and social development. 
Overly restrictive street trading by-laws are a direct interference in poor people’s aspirations and 
their enforcement a violation of the ICESCR.  
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4.6 People with disabilities 
The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with disabilities has as a central objective to prevent 
and eradicate unfair discrimination against people with disabilities.186 Articles 12 to 16 of the 
Convention deal with the rights of persons with disabilities pertaining to equality before the law, 
access to justice, liberty and security of the person, freedom from torture and other ill treatment, 
and freedom from exploitation, violence and abuse. Guideline 33 of the ACHPR Luanda 
Guidelines on Arrest and Pre-trial Detention provides a number of protective measures for persons 
with disabilities coming onto contact with the criminal justice system.  
From the outset it should be noted that there is very limited research on people with disabilities in 
Africa. Nonetheless, a significant proportion, some 300 million people, of the African population 
live with disabilities.187 Disability is caused by many factors, including malnutrition and disease, 
environmental hazards, traffic and industrial accidents, and civil conflict and war. The 
overwhelming majority of people living with disabilities in Africa are excluded from schools and 
opportunities for work, virtually guaranteeing that they live as the poorest of the poor.188 Access to 
schooling is limited, and it is estimated that no more than five to 10 per cent access education and 
as many as 70 to 80 per cent of working-age people with disabilities are unemployed.189 Social 
stigma associated with disability results in marginalisation and isolation, often leading to begging 
as the sole means of survival.190 
Support services for people living with disabilities, in particular psychosocial and intellectual 
disabilities, are wholly inadequate across the continent.191 Psychiatric hospitals are usually located 
in the capital only and the number of psychiatrists is inadequate; in 2000 Ethiopia, with a 
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population of 55 million at the time, had 11 qualified psychiatrists.192 In the absence of suitable 
care for people with psychosocial and intellectual disabilities, Alem observes in respect of Ethiopia: 
‘Many of such patients become vagrant. Observing such patients walking about naked or 
dishevelled in villages and more often in the streets of towns is common.’193  
Given the sheer number of people living with disabilities in Africa, and coupled with their 
exclusion and marginalisation, it is inevitable that some people living with disabilities will come 
into contact with the criminal justice system, even for offences such as loitering, begging and 
vagrancy. In many states begging is criminalised (for example, Eritrea,194 DRC,195 Guinea,196 
Kenya, 197  Nigeria, 198  South Africa, 199  the Gambia, 200  Tunisia, 201  and Uganda 202 ) as well as 
loitering and being a rogue and vagabond. The enforcement of these laws will sooner or later net 
people with disabilities. The use of criminal law to respond to the need for support services in the 
community or treatment is not only an inappropriate intervention but also escalates a decidedly 
non-criminal situation into a criminal one where violence and forceful arrest are used.  
Persons with psychosocial and intellectual disabilities are arbitrarily arrested in two ways. The first 
is through ‘sweeping operations’ where all persons with psychosocial and intellectual disabilities 
are rounded up and arrested, not for any offence committed but for being on the streets. Secondly, 
police use power vested in them by the petty offence provisions in criminal law to arrest persons 
with psychosocial disabilities who are in a mental crisis. In many jurisdictions, criminal statutes, 
mental health legislation and, at times, the Constitution, criminalise non-criminal behaviour of 
persons with psychosocial and intellectual disabilities. A study from Zambia identified three legal 
provisions enabling the police to arrest a person with psychosocial and intellectual disabilities:  
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the 1996 Constitution of Zambia (Article 13(1) (h)), which allows the arrest of individuals 
who are “reasonably suspected to be of unsound mind, addicted to drugs or alcohol, or a 
vagrant”; the Criminal Procedure Code Act (Section 27(b)), which empowers the police to 
arrest any person without a warrant “who has no ostensible means of subsistence or who 
cannot give a satisfactory account of himself”; and the Mental Disorders Act, Section 7, 
which empowers the police to arrest a person found to be “wandering at large”.203 
The same report notes further that there are no guidelines for police to determine the best route 
forward, that is, to make an arrest, not make an arrest or take the person to a psychiatric hospital.204 
In the absence of clear guidelines and procedures, the result may be that people are arrested 
unnecessarily, do not receive the appropriate treatment promptly, and end up in prison awaiting 
trial for long periods. Due to limited capacity in psychiatric hospitals, it is not uncommon that 
persons with psychosocial and intellectual disabilities may await transfer to a psychiatric hospital 
for treatment205 or assessment206 in a prison, or, in the absence of such a facility, be detained 
indefinitely in a prison.207 
The lack of adequate care services and treatment facilities has the regrettable consequence that 
persons with psychosocial and intellectual disabilities are pushed onto the streets where they are 
not able to fend for themselves and are at risk of arrest for offences such as loitering, vagrancy and 
begging. Even if the behaviour of such individuals in public spaces is offensive or unsettling, it 
does not require a criminal justice response but rather a mental health-care approach as required 
by the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. This Convention obliges states 
‘[t]o take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, 
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regulations, customs and practices that constitute discrimination against persons with 
disabilities’.208 
Accurate figures on the number of people with psychosocial and intellectual disabilities detained 
in police cells and prisons are not available, but it is safe to assume that it is higher than the norm 
in the general population. Regardless of the charges against them, it is furthermore accepted that 
in general they will not receive the appropriate care and medication whilst in police detention or 
imprisoned.209 A UNODC report noted: 
The difficulties people with disabilities face in society are magnified in prisons, given the 
nature of the closed and restricted environment and violence resulting from overcrowding, 
lack of proper prisoner differentiation and supervision, among others. Prison overcrowding 
accelerates the disabling process, with the neglect, psychological stress and lack of adequate 
medical care, characteristic of overcrowded prisons.210 
While the needs of a person may depend on the nature of the disability, some common areas have 
been identified: 
• Access to justice: Prisoners with disabilities face numerous challenges in accessing justice, 
especially when officials are not appropriately trained or deliberately marginalise people 
with disabilities.  
• Protection: Due to their vulnerable physical condition, prisoners with disabilities are easy 
targets for abuse and violence from other prisoners and prison staff. For example, prison 
guards may confiscate from prisoners wheelchairs, crutches, braces, hearing aids, glasses 
and medications. Prisoners who need special assistance with daily activities, such as eating, 
dressing and bathing, may be simply ignored, left without meals and forced to urinate on 
themselves in the absence of bathroom assistance. Prisoners with disabilities may be 
psychologically abused, for example, by the moving around of furniture in the cell of a 
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visually impaired prisoner or by verbal taunts. Women prisoners with disabilities are at a 
particularly high risk of manipulation, violence, sexual abuse and rape. 
• Discrimination: Prisoners with disabilities encounter difficulties in accessing services, 
complying with rules and participating in prison activities that do not take account of their 
special needs. Due to architectural barriers, prisoners with mobility impairments may be 
unable to access dining areas, libraries, sanitary facilities, work, recreation and visiting 
rooms. Prisoners with visual disabilities cannot read their own mail unassisted or prison 
rules and regulations, unless these are provided in braille. Prisoners with a hearing or 
speaking disability may be denied interpreters, making it impossible for them to participate 
in various prison activities. All of these forms of discrimination may result in significantly 
lengthening their periods of imprisonment. 
• Health care: Prisoners with disabilities may have particular health-care needs related to 
their disability, such as physiotherapy, regular eyesight and hearing examinations and 
occupational therapy, some of which may be difficult to meet in prisons. They also need 
access to tools and services that enable them to enjoy their human rights in prisons to the 
fullest possible extent, such as hearing aids, wheelchairs, canes and orthotics. Prisoners 
with disabilities are also likely to be in need of mental health care. Increased mental health-
care needs have been noted, for example, among prisoners who have sensory disability 
conditions, which are isolating in themselves and more so in prisons, where the special 
needs of such persons are rarely taken into account and where they can be victims of 
psychological abuse and bullying. 
Central to the problem is that inadequate care and support services result in people with 
psychosocial and intellectual disabilities being at risk of arrest and detention for petty offences 
such as vagrancy and loitering. The declassification and decriminalisation of these offences should 
at least prevent arrest and detention, which in all likelihood will be detrimental to their physical 
and mental well-being.  




5 Arrest for petty offences does not promote public safety and the punishments are 
disproportional 
5.1 The police inherited from colonial powers and police reform 
The roots of African policing lie in Europe. However, the model replicated in Africa was not the 
European model of civilian policing but one that protected the ruling white colonial elite and aimed 
at social control, the vestiges of which are still visible in many jurisdictions.211 Africa inherited a 
mode of policing established by the colonial powers which has remained intact, emphasising high 
arrest rates, supported by myriad petty offences that justify arrest without a warrant. Policing was 
not aimed at general public safety; there was little investigative capacity or purpose in policing, 
and the style of policing was para-military in character as it served a narrow interest group with 
political and commercial concerns.  
Baker describes the following as characteristic of the colonial policing that was used as a means to 
bring the local population under criminal justice control: 
Not only did the Europeans use armed policing, but just as importantly, they 
equipped themselves with “a legal arsenal of arbitrary regulations to carry out [their] 
responsibilities: diverse master-and-servant ordinances, specified periods of 
obligatory labour service at state defined tasks, plenary powers to local 
administrators to impose penalties for disobedience”. Charges of “vagrancy”, 
“prostitution”, “beer brewing”, “smuggling”, “poaching”, membership of an 
“unlawful society”, “native witchcraft” and the catch-all “public nuisance” were 
used to criminalize Africans, to control their labour and to repatriate them to 
“native” areas. This legal framework “enabled the police to tackle legalistically 
what it had previously accomplished militaristically. State law provided the 
technical procedures and the bureaucratic framework that enabled the police to 
rationalise their activities as law enforcement”.212 
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It is argued that Africa has a social disciplinarian mode of policing.213 This kind of policing model 
entails that the actions and behaviour of the police are designed to send authoritative messages 
about the relative position of the police and the policed.214 This is in comparison to two other modes 
of policing, namely due process and crime control. The former model communicates the law’s 
concern with individual autonomy and integrity, along with its commitment to maintaining close 
control over state power. The latter model, crime control, communicates the desirability of speed 
and efficiency and indicates the trust that can be placed in police and prosecutors.215  
Under the social disciplinarian mode of policing, there is little interest in fact or guilt, but rather 
emphasis on social control and maintaining authority by demanding respect and inflicting summary 
punishment.216 Arresting and detaining a suspect at a police station renders the suspect powerless, 
and the police station is an ideal environment ‘at which to subject recalcitrant members of the 
police community to a status degradation ceremony’.217 The aim was not primarily to detect crimes, 
solve them and refer for prosecution and thus enhance public safety (the crime control model of 
policing), but instead something that has more to do with social discipline than the rule of law.  
In executing arrests the police may contend that they use their powers of arrest in pursuit of the 
rule of law, but there is a hidden system at play serving police goals (for example, communicating 
authority) and enabling the powers of arrest to be used as summary punishment.218 It is clear that 
the African style of policing inherited from the colonial past contributes substantially to the 
arbitrary manner in which some arrests are executed in African countries, to the attitudes of law 
enforcement officials in the execution of these arrests, and in particular to the existence of these 
petty offences. There is a need to address police reform by focusing on the colonial style of policing 
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and arrest practices and by decriminalising offences that exist in the current mode of policing in 
Africa.219 
It is no secret that law enforcement officials are pressured to arrest people to fulfil performance 
target indicators set by governmental departments: various media reports and departmental annual 
strategic documents illustrate this.220 The key issue to be taken from this is that when there are 
arrest targets (explicit or mediated), the police will arrest to reach the target. If it is a mediated 
target, this will be used to make themselves appear to be effective, and it will be people who 
potentially offer the least resistance that will be targeted to make up the quota, such as the homeless, 
immigrants, street children, sex workers and so forth.221 It will also be the most trivial offences that 
will be easy to come by. These arrests have little if any impact on crime reduction and may indeed 
be counter-productive.222 The focus on arrest targets provides an opportunity for police to conduct 
random arrests for minor offences and has the consequence of using more law enforcement officials 
and resources in fighting very minor forms of crime, which might lead to criminals getting away 
with serious crime.  
In South Africa, the Khayelitsha Commission, set up to investigate police performance in the area, 
noted that intermediate performance targets may contribute to abusive arrest practices.223 A good 
example of this is using the amount of alcohol confiscated by the police from unlicensed traders as 
a performance indicator, which will be reflected in the police annual report as an achievement and 
thereby encourage arrests.224 In Dorset, England, where arrest targets were used, a change in policy 
demonstrated the impact of scrapping arrest targets, given that the number of children arrested fell 
by 74 per cent over a five-year period and resulted in the development of alternative measures to 
deal with problem behaviour.225  
There is a need to do away with indicators emphasising police outputs, such as the number of 
arrests, roadblocks, stop-and-searches, the response time and so forth.226 These do not provide a 
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comprehensive picture of police performance aimed at advancing public safety and improving 
public relations.227 A paradigm shift is needed so that police officials do not equate good policing 
with meeting performance quotas. 228  Police action should always be motivated by a sound 
knowledge of police purpose, and should involve a consistent application of the law.229 Until we 
see police legitimacy as the ultimate measure of police performance, illegitimate activities that 
enhance current measures of police performance will continue, and the risk that the police alienate 
themselves from the population will grow.230 
5.2 Arrests for petty offences do not promote public safety 
The nebulous offences contained in many African legal systems regarding loitering, being idle and 
disorderly, and being a rogue and vagabond, date back to the colonial era and target individuals 
who are supposedly idle, lazy, drunk, unwilling to work, habitual criminals or ‘morally 
depraved’.231 Criminal justice audits commissioned by the Open Society Initiative for Southern 
Africa between 2013 and 2015 in Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique show that a significant number 
of persons in prison are detained for petty offences relating to being a rogue and vagabond, touting 
and loitering.232 In a recent case in Malawi, for instance, the magistrate noted that ‘[t]he tendency 
of loitering within the town at night can make the town prone to crime’.233 It is unclear what 
evidence the learned magistrate relied on to substantiate this conclusion. Crime prevention and the 
promotion of public safety are often cited as the justification for retaining colonial offences and 
executing arrests therefore. Aggressive arrest strategies adopting a ‘zero-tolerance’ approach to 
crime and a strict enforcement of petty offences are frequently observed across the continent. The 
underlying assumption is that this will prevent the ‘development of an atmosphere conducive to 
more serious criminal offending’.234  
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The argument that arrests for petty crimes are vital to promote social order, public safety and crime 
prevention has been soundly rebutted in the authoritative Sherman report, a meta-analysis of 
existing research on what works and what does not in reducing crime.235 A key finding in the 
Sherman report regarding policing is that the extent to which any law enforcement agency can have 
an impact on crime or prevent crime may depend on how well it is focused on specific objectives, 
tasks, places, times and people. More importantly, success depends upon putting police where 
serious crime is concentrated at the times it is most likely to occur, thus focusing on risk factors.236  
The employment of more police personnel to provide rapid emergency responses, unfocused 
random patrols and reactive arrests237 does not prevent serious crime. Community policing without 
a clear focus on crime risk factors generally shows no effect on crime. Directed patrols,238 proactive 
arrests239 and problem-solving at high-crime ‘hot spots’, on the other hand, have shown substantial 
evidence of crime prevention.240 Furthermore, studies have shown that arresting people for minor 
offences may reduce violence in the short run but may also increase serious crime in the long run.241  
Sherman notes that being arrested by the police for a petty crime can permanently lower police 
legitimacy, both for arrested persons and their social network of family and friends, because being 
arrested is usually a traumatic experience for most people242 and perceived to be unjust and often 
discriminatory. Police officers often treat arrestees harshly in an effort to ‘show them who is boss’ 
and to punish them, as they know that few of these arrests will make it to court. Those arrested feel 
unduly victimised over a petty misdemeanour and studies show this makes the arrested person 
more defiant towards law enforcement officials.243 Studies have also found that arrests for petty 
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crimes seldom act as deterrents to individuals, especially if they are unemployed and feel 
marginalised.244 Instead, these arrests can lead to increased disorder and criminality.245  
Greene mentions that ‘get tough’ measures that lead to lengthy incarceration of a large number of 
young offenders (notably drug offenders) may offer a measure of short-term relief for law-abiding 
residents.246 The difficulty is that in the long term the negative consequences may wash out the 
short-term positives: ‘this is because the deterrent effects of such a strategy are weak at best, 
whereas its damaging effects – disruption of family ties, stigmatizing barriers to labour market 
participation, increased levels of alienation and distrust – may prove crimogenic in themselves’.247 
Sherman concluded that the ‘modest but consistent scientific evidence supports the hypothesis that 
the less respectful police are towards suspects and citizens generally, the less people will comply 
with the law’.248 He notes that  
changing police “style” may thus be as important as focusing police substance. Making both 
the style and substance of police practices more “legitimate” in the eyes of the public, 
particularly high-risk juveniles, may be one of the most effective long-term police strategies 
for crime prevention.249 
An aggressive policing style focusing on petty offenders ‘may thus actually reduce police 
presence’.250 Not all socially undesirable conduct needs to be classified as a crime or result in arrest 
and detention.251 Criminal justice systems are the main consumers of prison resources throughout 
the world, and the first question to ask when tackling the issue of excessive arrest and detention is 
whether particular forms of conduct must fall within the scope of the criminal justice system.252 
While some behaviour may be annoying, it should not follow that criminalisation is the solution. 
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Even if criminalised, it should equally not follow that arrest and detention are required. Many of 
the offences discussed above require a socioeconomic response and not a law enforcement or 
criminal justice response. 
Governments need to change their law enforcement strategies to focus on high-risk people, places, 
offences and times rather than focusing on petty offences, many of which involve poor and 
vulnerable persons who pose no threat to public safety. Decriminalising these offences and dealing 
with the behaviour outside of the criminal justice system will not only reduce the burden on the 
system but also produce a long-term positive impact on public safety.253 
5.3 The punishments are disproportional  
Loitering, begging, and being a rogue or vagabond are not behaviours that endanger public safety, 
yet they attract disproportionate punishments. The use of imprisonment for such offences exact a 
weighty punishment on people so convicted and causes great harm and suffering for a trivial 
offence.  
The Kenya Penal Code (2014) states that a person who is convicted of being a ‘common nuisance’ 
may be liable to imprisonment for a period of one year.254 The same law, in section 185(b), defines 
idle and disorderly persons as beggars and prescribes a punishment of one month imprisonment, 
and, for second and subsequent offences, up to one year of imprisonment plus a fine of KSh100.255 
The Botswana Penal Code defines ‘common nuisance’ in a similar manner and prescribes one year 
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of imprisonment. 256  Table 1 below provides a sample of a number of African countries 
criminalising loitering and begging, and the prescribed punishments.257 
 
Table 1 
COUNTRY OFFENCE PUNISHMENT REFERENCE 
CAMEROON LOITERING Imprisonment and a 
fine 
The penal code 
DRC BEGGING Can receive warning 
but the law provides 





forced labour from 
one to seven years 
Decret du 23 mai 1896, tel que modifié et 
complété par le Decret du 6 décembre 
1958 
ETHIOPIA LOITERING/VAGRANCY Imprisonment 
(direct) 
Vagrancy Control Proclamation, Proc. No. 
348/2004 
GUINEA VAGRANCY 3-6 months 
imprisonment 
Guinée: Code pénal [Guinea], 31 
December 1988, 
KENYA LOITERING Imprisonment or a 
fine 
Kenya Penal Code S 182, Mombasa 
Municipal By-Law, Kisumu 
Municipal Council by laws,  
 BEGGING  Kenya Penal Code S182(B) 
NIGERIA LOITERING Imprisonment Section 199 of the Penal Code; Sections 
166(a)(i) and (ii) of the Criminal Law of 
Lagos State, 2011 
 BEGGING  Section 2 of the Illegal Collection of Dues 
in Public Place (prohibition) Law of 
Lagos State 2003. 
TUNISIA BEGGING Imprisonment 
(suspended) 
Article 171 du code pénal 
UGANDA LOITERING Imprisonment or 
fine or both 
The Penal Code Act, Cap. 120, Laws of 
Uganda Section 167(d) which criminalises 
a person considered as publicly 
conducting her/himself in a manner likely 
to cause a breach of peace 
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COUNTRY OFFENCE PUNISHMENT REFERENCE 
 BEGGING Imprisonment or 
fine or both 
The Penal Code Act, Cap. 120 Laws of 
Uganda, Section 167(b) and (g) 
ZIMBABWE LOITERING Fine Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) 
Act. Also use section 81 of the Criminal 
Code (Soliciting) 
ERITREA BEGGING Fine $100-$400, 
imprisonment 1-6 
months 
Art. 206. - Dishonest Begging. (1) A 
person who: (a) encourages a child to beg; 
or (b) begs as a member of or at the 
direction of a group that carries on 
begging as a business, is guilty of 
unlawful begging, a Class 2 petty offence, 
punishable with a definite term of 
imprisonment of not less than 1 month 
and not more than 6 months, or a fine of 
5 001 - 20 000 Nakfas, to be set in 
intervals of 1 000 Nakfas. (2) The 
provisions of this Article shall not apply 
where members of a family solely carry 
out the encouragement or other activity. 
NAMIBIA LOITERING Unknown Vagrancy Proclamation 25 of 1920, s. 
3(1) (national), Various local authority 
regulations, such as Katima Mutilo, 
Hentiesbaai and Karasburg Street 
Regulations, ss. 10, 32; Luderitz Street 
Regulations ss. 11, 25.  
SOUTH AFRICA LOITERING Fine or 
imprisonment 
The City of Cape Town By-Law Relating 
to Streets, Public Spaces and the 
Prevention of Noise Nuisances; The 
Ethekwini Municipality: Nuisances and 
Behaviour in Public Places By-Law, 2015 
- Paragraph 21(1)(a); The City of 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality 
Public Road and Miscellaneous By-Laws, 
published on 21 May 2000.  
 
6 Pre-trial detention and overcrowding 
This section deals with pre-trial detention and petty offences, paying particular attention to prison 
overcrowding and arrest practices in Africa and the socioeconomic impact of pre-trial detention. 




Recent studies have made available more accurate quantitative data that provide better insight into 
trends and could support the decriminalisation and declassification of petty offences.  
6.1 Overcrowding is an Africa-wide problem 
Africa’s prisons are not filled with petty offenders, but there is evidence that they make up a notable 
proportion in many African states. Overcrowding is a problem in nearly all African prisons and all 
efforts should be made to address this, as called for by the Ouagadougou Declaration and Plan of 
Action. 
There are nearly 1.2 million prisoners in Africa, according to the International Centre for Prison 
Studies (ICPS).258 Using the available data it was calculated that some 340 000 of these are pre-
trial detainees, representing some 14 per cent of the world’s pre-trial population. On average, pre-
trial detainees constitute 42 per cent of national total prison populations in Africa, but this ranges 
from 90 per cent (Libya) to 6 per cent (Algeria). Of the 46 countries and territories for which data 
are available, only seven do not have overcrowded prisons, these being Botswana, Sao Tome e 
Principe, Namibia, Reunion (France), Lesotho, Niger and Algeria.  
Using the data from the ICPS, it was furthermore calculated that in countries with overcrowded 
prisons, the bed space shortfall is roughly 242 000. Occupancy levels range from 388 per cent 
(Comoros) to 60 per cent (Niger). In total, 73 per cent of African prisoners are held in prisons that 
are at higher than 100 per cent capacity and 32 per cent in prisons that are at 150 per cent or more 
capacity. In short, prison overcrowding is a near-universal phenomenon on the continent, affecting 
the overwhelming majority of prisoners.259 Basic figures on Africa’s prison population per country 








No. of pre-trial 
detainees 
Algeria 60 220 6 88 3 734 
Angola 21 634 48 167 10 319 
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No. of pre-trial 
detainees 
Benin 7 247 75 364 5 428 
Botswana 3 826 23 100 891 
Burkina Faso 6 251 48 171 3 000 
Burundi 8 646 52 214 4 479 
Cameroon 25 337 62 149 15 760 
Cape Verde 1 434 30 122 424 
Central African Rep. 845 70 - 593 
Chad 4 831 63 232 3 063 
Comoros 233 56 388 130 
Congo (Brazzaville) 1 240 75 - 930 
Cote d’Ivoire 10 850 42 218 4 557 
Djibouti 600 50 171 300 
DRC 22 000 82 - 18 040 
Egypt 62 000 - - - 
Equatorial Guinea 1 000 10 - 99 
Ethiopia 93 044 14 - 13 026 
Gabon 3 500 33 - 1 155 
Gambia 914 22 141 203 
Ghana 14 297 17 145 2 416 
Guinea Bissau 92 - 102 - 
Kenya 54 154 40 202 21 878 
Lesotho 2 073 20 71 404 
Liberia 1 719 83 138 1 427 
Libya 6 187 90 142 5 568 
Madagascar 18 719 53 181 9 921 
Malawi 12 156 16 174 1 957 
Mali 4 963 53 223 2 620 
Mauritania 1 768 41 102 725 
Mauritius 2 123 36 117 769 










No. of pre-trial 
detainees 
Mayotte (France) 173 - 107 - 
Morocco 76 000 43 158 32 300 
Mozambique 15 663 33 201 5 106 
Namibia 3 560 7 96 235 
Niger 7 116 54 60 3 843 
Nigeria 57 121 69 114 39 585 
Republic of Guinea 2 600 65 175 1 690 
Reunion (France) 1 022 - 85 - 
Rwanda 55 618 7 102 3 949 
Sao Tome e Principe 201 11 77 22 
Senegal 8 630 41 117 3 573 
Seychelles 735 16 143 114 
Sierra Leone 3 792 59 212 2 237 
Somalia 3 450 - - - 
South Africa 159 241 27 133 42 836 
South Sudan 7 500 45 - 3 375 
Sudan 19 101 20 255 3 897 
Swaziland 3 616 18 127 654 
Tanzania 34 196 50 120 17 132 
Togo 4 493 65 165 2 929 
Tunisia 23 686 54 139 12 790 
Uganda 42 013 55 255 23 107 
Zambia 17 160 23 279 3 981 
Zimbabwe 18 857 17 111 3 225 
TOTAL 1 019 447    340 398 
AVERAGE  42 160  
 
There is no single solution for prison overcrowding as the causes lie, by and large, in criminal 
justice processes that result in unnecessary detention and long periods of custody. Possible 




solutions must therefore be sought in a multiplicity of localities, and with the overall aim of 
avoiding arrest, reducing the use of detention and expediting the flow of cases through the criminal 
justice system. 
A concerted and sustained effort to reduce overcrowding can reap rewards in a relatively short 
period of time. Based on the figures in Table 2, it was calculated that if the African pre-trial 
population is reduced by five per cent every year, it will take 14 years to bring it to just below half 
of its current level, which will reduce the overall prison population size by 17 per cent – a not 
insignificant improvement. In short, small contributions can have a much larger impact. The 
decriminalisation of petty offences can make such a contribution, as well as avoiding arrests and 
detention for petty offences through declassification. 
6.2 Petty offences, arrests and detention 
An audit of case-flow management in Malawi found the following proportions of persons admitted 
to pre-trial detention in selected prisons, as shown in Table 3. The audit noted that between one 
and eight per cent of admissions were for petty offences.260  
Table 3 
Prison Offence Percentage 
Chichiri Touting 2% 
Illegal immigrant 4% 
Kachere Rogue and vagabond 3% 
Hemp offences 1% 
Mzuzu Rogue and vagabond 8% 
 
A more detailed analysis of pre-trial admissions at Mzimba Prison (Malawi) from 2006 to 2010 
also found that not insignificant proportions of people are admitted for petty offences, as shown in 
Table 4 below. While the actual numbers may appear low as it was a sample, the percentages 
indicate that between eight and 13 per cent of detainees are admitted for petty offences, or roughly 
one out of ten admissions. 
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Offence 2006 2007 2009 2010 
Prostitution 1    
Rogue and vagabond 1 1 1  
Touting 1 1   
Breach of the peace  2 1 2 
Witchcraft  1  1 
Proposing violence     
Hemp offences   1 2 
In possession of forest products without a 
licence 
  1  
Total 3 5 4 5 
Percentage 8% 13% 10% 13% 
 
In the case of Zambia, a similar study found the following profile for admissions to police and 
prison custody, using a sample of nine police stations and nine prisons, as shown in Table 5.261  
Table 5 
Police Prison 
Loitering 8% Riotous behaviour 2% 
Failure to obey police officer 2%   
Driving offences 1%   
 
A sample of admissions to Nairobi Central Remand and Thika Remand prisons in Kenya found 
that even for petty offences, detainees can spend extraordinary lengths of time in pre-trial detention 
(Table 6).262 At the time of the field work, the greatest duration in detention was 447 days (15 
months), for the offence of ‘failing to produce accused (accomplice)’; in this case the detainee had 
still not been released but remained in custody. This case was followed by illegal possession of 
farm produce (383 days), creating a disturbance (344 days), and illegal possession of farm produce 
(321 days). At Thika Remand Prison these admissions for petty offences constituted 38 per cent of 
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admissions, and at Nairobi Central Remand, 7 per cent (the latter prison holds a wider range of 
offences and also more serious cases, such as murder). 
Table 6 
Case Offences Days in detention 
1 Being unlawful in Kenya 34 
2 Bond to keep peace 2 
3 Bond to keep peace 64 
4 Bond to keep peace 206 
5 Bond to keep peace 76 
6 Creating disturbance 3 
7 Creating disturbance 7 
8 Creating disturbance 143 
9 Creating disturbance 198 
10 Creating disturbance 344 
11 Damaging flower plants on public street 273 
12 Depositing Refuse C/Sec 30(1) 75 
13 Depositing Refuse C/Sec 30(1) 204 
14 Destroying plants on land 43 
15 Failing to produce accused (accomplice) 447 
16 Illegal possession of farm produce 253 
17 Illegal possession of farm produce 383 
18 Illegal possession of farm produce 51 
19 Illegal possession of farm produce 89 
20 Illegal possession of farm produce 121 
21 Illegal possession of farm produce 321 
22 Possession of cannabis  212 
23 Possession of cannabis  30 
24 Possession of Bhang (cannabis) 37 
25 Possession of changaa (homemade liquor) 266 




Case Offences Days in detention 
26 Possession of changaa (homemade liquor) 127 
27 Possession of narcotics 8 
28 Possession of narcotics 37 
29 Possession of narcotics 135 
30 Possession of narcotics 258 
31 Removal of forest produce 233 
32 Riding in a dangerous position 129 
33 Rioting after proclamation 58 
34 Selling alcohol without licence 317 
35 Selling alcohol without licence 144 
36 Theft of farm produce 63 
37 Touting 77 
 
The overall impression from the above is that the detention for petty offences makes up less than 
15 per cent of admissions. Nonetheless, declassification and decriminalisation can have a material 
impact on prisoner numbers if it is assumed that one in ten pre-trial detainee admissions is 
unnecessary. The data haves also shown that detainees can remain in custody for very long periods, 
which is a violation of the right to a speedy trial, especially in the light of the trivial nature of the 
offence. Pre-trial detention, especially that which is prolonged, can have serious socioeconomic 
consequences on poor and marginalised households, as discussed in the next section. 
6.3 Pre-trial detention has significant socioeconomic impact 
Across the world it is the case that it is predominantly the poor and marginalised who end up in 
prisons awaiting trial. The UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights 
succinctly summarised the socioeconomic impact of pre-trial detention in a recent report:  
The economic and social costs of detention and incarceration can be devastating for 
persons living in poverty. Detention and incarceration can lead to loss of income 
and employment and often temporary or permanent withdrawal of social benefits. 
Their families, particularly their children, are also directly affected. Therefore, 
criminal justice systems predicated on detention and incarceration, even for minor 




non-violent crimes, can themselves represent a significant obstacle to access to 
justice for persons living in poverty. Those who are poor and vulnerable are likely 
to leave detention disproportionately financially, physically and personally 
disadvantaged.263 
The section below reports key findings from research undertaken to demonstrate and quantify the 
socioeconomic impact of pre-trial detention and the complexity with which it plays out in three 
African countries: Kenya, Mozambique and Zambia.264 The research design was informed by the 
framework for socioeconomic rights set out in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR)265 and fair trial rights in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.266 
The nature of the obligations on states set out by the ICESCR is not that states must ensure that 
every person has employment, social security and the like, but rather that states should ‘respect’, 
‘protect’ and ‘promote’ these socioeconomic rights. The duty to ‘respect’ entails an obligation not 
to interfere with the resources of individuals, their freedom to find a job, nor their freedom to take 
necessary action and to use their resources to satisfy needs. This duty to respect socioeconomic 
rights intersects with fair trial rights when states make and enforce criminal procedural and criminal 
laws. Respect for socioeconomic rights by states in this context would mean that criminal 
procedural laws and practices are designed and implemented in such a way as to ensure that the 
                                                      
263 A/67/278 para. 50. 
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265 Kenya and Zambia have ratified the ICESCR but Mozambique has not. The rights enumerated in the ICESCR 
include: the equal right of men and women to pursue economic, social and cultural rights (art. 3); the right to work and 
the duty of the state to take measures to enable people to access gainful employment (art. 6); the right to just conditions 
of employment (art. 7); the right to social security (art. 9); the duty of the state to provide the widest possible protection 
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266 The ICCPR, in articles 9-15, sets out the following rights: 
• arrested or detained persons must be brought promptly before a judicial officer and be entitled to trial within 
a reasonable time or to release;  
• it must not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial are detained in custody, but release may be subject 
to guarantees to appear for trial; 
• there must be a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal;  
• there must be equality before the courts and tribunals;  
• there must not be arbitrary detention;  
• there must be restriction of the use of incommunicado detention;  
• there is access for lawyers, doctors and family; and  
• there is independent internal and external oversight. 




impact of interference with socioeconomic rights on all persons is minimised, by ensuring that it 
(the detention of an accused) occurs only when absolutely necessary and for the shortest possible 
duration. Arresting and detaining people for petty offences is an interference with people’s 
aspirations to fulfil their socioeconomic needs. 
The socioeconomic impact of pre-trial detention is multi-dimensional and is also spread unevenly 
across individuals and households, depending on their degree of vulnerability. The research points 
to a complex set of factors that interact to either intensify or ameliorate the socioeconomic impact 
of pre-trial detention. Moreover, households respond in different ways to the fact that a member or 
the head of the household has been imprisoned awaiting trial. The central issue is that when an 
individual is arrested and detained awaiting trial, in most instances it has a socioeconomic impact 
on other people. Detaining people in prison to await trial on charges relating to petty offences is 
disproportionate and is, it will be argued, counter-developmental and not in the interests of justice. 
While the findings below relate to all pre-trial detainees and are not exclusive to petty offenders, 
they nonetheless demonstrate the impact of pre-trial detention. It is submitted that the link between 
pre-trial detention and its socioeconomic impact is central to the arguments in favour of 
decriminalisation and declassification.  
6.3.1 Detainee proportional contribution is above 60 per cent of household income 
If the detainee is the main or sole income-earner in the household and he or she is imprisoned, it 
follows that the impact will be more severe. For example, where figures were available it was found 
that in Kenya the median proportional detainee contribution to total household income was 67 per 
cent, in Mozambique 70 per cent, and in Zambia 100 per cent. The loss of such income is immediate 
and severe due to the disappearance of at least a relatively stable cash income. The more income-
earners a household has, the better able it will be to cope with the loss of income, but the research 
indicates that there is generally a reliance on one income-earner for the overwhelming majority of 
total household income. 
6.3.2 Gender is important 
The research shows that gender is an important variable in the socioeconomic impact of pre-trial 
detention. Generally, female detainees have more dependants than males, and they have more 
dependants who are not their children. For example, 50 per cent of Kenyan female detainees had 
three or more dependants, compared to 25 per cent of men. Women also make very substantial 




non-financial contributions to households: in Kenya it was found that 50 per cent of females cared 
for children and some 53 per cent cleaned houses. In Mozambique some 37 per cent of female 
detainees were reported to clean the house, 33 per cent cared for children, 10 per cent mentioned 
being involved in food or farm production, and 7 per cent were responsible for cooking.  
Male detainees also made significant non-financial contributions to household income, but these 
focused on food production and maintenance of the residential structure. It is generally the pattern 
that men are charged with more serious offences and also in some countries for offences for which 
bail is not allowed. For example, in Kenya 56 per cent of women were detained for theft, compared 
to 23 per cent of men. The result is that they spend longer periods in detention. For male detainees 
in Kenya, the median duration of detention was 30 days, in Mozambique 328 days, and in Zambia 
an earlier study by the authors found a range of medians for each of the prisons, ranging from 11 
to 112 days.267  
When a woman is imprisoned, the impact is felt by her children, other children she may have cared 
for and in the general household workload, cash income and security. Men, on the other hand, are 
firstly the numerical majority in pre-trial detention and are generally charged with more serious 
offences that result in longer periods of detention. The socioeconomic impact is frequently felt by 
wives and mothers, who are forced into earning roles while attempting to continue to visit and 
support detainees. In Zambia, 94 per cent of families interviewed experienced a loss of income; in 
Kenya 75 per cent; and in Mozambique 64 per cent. As a consequence of this, food insecurity 
increased for the majority of households. Even though the findings relate to pre-trial detention in 
general, they also apply to those charged with petty offences. 
6.3.3 The impact is most severe at the start of detention  
The research indicates that the initial socioeconomic impact of pre-trial detention is most severe at 
the start of detention but that over time households develop new coping strategies and their 
situation improves, largely because they reduce expenses related to the detention itself (that is, 
regular visits and bringing less food and other materials). This may also be a consequence of having 
depleted available reserves and resources. However, coping strategies may involve selling assets, 
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borrowing money and stopping visits to prisons. While households may become less dependent on 
the detainee, it does not mean that their socioeconomic position has improved. Even if a person is 
detained for a relatively short period (on a petty offence), the impact is still severe on poor and 
marginal households. 
6.3.4 Children suffer negative consequences 
Children are extremely vulnerable to negative changes in the socioeconomic position of the 
household. This is manifested in a number of ways, such as decreased access to schooling (for 
example, they cannot afford school fees or drop out of school), relocating to relatives or friends, 
food security, general security, lack of or limited supervision by adults, and so forth. It may also 
happen that older children are removed from school to take care of younger children and to perform 
the duties previously performed by the detainee. Children are therefore affected by the loss of 
financial and non-financial support services rendered by the detainee or affected by the detention, 
and this may have a longer-term socioeconomic and psychological impact.  
In Kenya, some 16 per cent (20 per cent of those who had children in the household) said that the 
children in the household were forced to relocate as a result of the detention; 11 per cent of 
households with children reported that the children’s behaviour had been adversely affected by the 
detention; 11 per cent reported that the children missed school; while three per cent reported that 
the children had dropped out of school. In Mozambique, some 13 per cent said the children in their 
household were forced to relocate and live with another relative as a result of the detention. This 
was 32 per cent for female detainees and three per cent for male detainees. How an additional child 
impacted on the receiving household is not known, but it can be assumed that it would add to 
expenses. 
6.3.5 Assets are sold to cover new expenses and loss of income 
The research found that many detainees did not hold significant assets, but where this was recorded 
it was fairly common of households to dispose of assets to generate cash. Selling assets may, 
however, be a short-term strategy increasing longer-term vulnerability. Selling of animals or 
equipment with which food security can be maintained or an income generated may bring 
immediate support to the detainee but pull the household deeper into poverty. Such sales are likely 
to have long-term consequences.  




In Zambia 53 per cent, Kenya 22 per cent, and Mozambique 9 per cent of households surveyed 
reported that they had been forced to sell at least one type of asset as a result of the losses caused 
by the detention. The items sold range from household appliances (for example, a stove) to 
livestock. In 4 per cent of Zambian case,s land was sold. Data from Kenya indicate that in half of 
instances, items were sold for less than the respondents wished to sell them. The difference between 
asking and selling price in these instances ranged from KSh150 (US$1.66) to KSh50000 (US$553), 
median KSh3000 (US$33). In other words, the sale resulted in realising less than the item was 
worth. Detention due to a petty offence that results in the sale of assets adds to the burden on the 
household. There is little doubt that the actions of the state will be perceived by affected households 
to be unjust and disproportionate to the alleged offence. Moreover, in the case of being detained 
for a petty offence, many of such detainees are poor and might not have assets to sell, and remain 
in detention as a result.  
6.3.6 Loss of employment and income 
If the detainee, regardless of the offence, is in formal employment it becomes increasingly likely 
that he or she will lose his or her employment the longer he or she remains in custody. Detainees 
may also be economic migrants (as was observed in Kenya in particular) and find themselves in an 
especially vulnerable situation, with their family and other support structures far away from where 
they are detained. If self-employed, it is likely that the detainee will lose the business client base 
unless there is a household member that can step into his or her shoes. Many interviewees expressed 
this fear and that their generally meagre earnings were now at risk. In Mozambique 72 per cent and 
in Zambia 65 per cent of detainees were earning an income at the time or their arrest.268 The loss 
of employment, and thus income, is significant in monetary terms. When the arrest and detention 
is for a petty offence, this places a disproportionate burden on poor households.269  
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6.3.7 Food security is threatened 
Pre-trial detention also impacts on food security, and 40 per cent of Kenyan households reported 
that they have less food as a result of the detention. This impact was even more when the household 
was linked to female detainees: 65 per cent compared to 35 per cent when it was a male detainee. 
Food security was less affected in Mozambique, and a relatively small percentage (seven per cent) 
reported that there was now less food in the house as a result of the detention. Although quantitative 
data on food security were not collected in Zambia, it can be deduced from the loss of income 
alluded to above, as well as other responses from persons interviewed, that food security in 
households diminished. The extent to which food security impacted on early childhood 
development was not researched in this project. 
6.3.8 Health is negatively affected 
The research found that large proportions of detained people were ill at the time of arrest and an 
increased proportion became ill during detention. While this had adverse consequences for them 
individually during detention, it may also hold longer-term consequences for them and the 
households they return to upon release as it may impact on their socioeconomic potential. In this 
regard, HIV-positive detainees may suffer more severe consequences under poor conditions of 
detention and limited medical treatment. The decriminalisation and declassification of petty 
offences will contribute to reducing overcrowding and this will contribute to an improvement in 
conditions of detention.  
In Kenya 75 per cent of female detainees were either ill at arrest or became ill in prison or both. Of 
those who were ill at arrest, 69 per cent developed additional illnesses while in prison.270 Some 77 
per cent of male detainees said they subsequently fell ill while in prison.271 In Mozambique 37 per 
cent of detainees said they were or became ill during imprisonment: 47 per cent of female detainees 
and 28 per cent of male detainees. The most common illness while in prison was malaria (12 per 
cent). Among female detainees, malaria was reported by 21 per cent among those who reported 
being ill, compared to nine per cent among male detainees. In Zambia 25 per cent of detainees said 
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they experienced ill health while in prison. After entering prison, some 11 per cent had malaria, 
two per cent had ulcers, two per cent had stomach pains, two percent were HIV-positive, and two 
per cent had back pains.  
Access to medical treatment and the effectiveness thereof were also less than desirable. In Kenya 
52 per cent of male detainees said they received treatment in prison, and only 52 per cent of this 
group said the treatment they were given helped. The situation in Mozambique was markedly 
better, with 92 per cent of those needing health care being able to access it and 80 per cent saying 
that it helped.272  
6.3.9 The cost of detention 
The detention, even for petty offences, of a household member brings new, direct and unplanned 
costs for the household. It was reported that, for example, visiting the detainee is one such cost as 
it is associated with transport, bringing food, other materials (for example, lotion), clothing, 
medicine and so forth. Securing private legal aid – or attempting to do so – or assistance from a 
state institution (for instance, the Human Rights Commission) may also result in costs. Gathering 
cash for bail, borrowing money, using savings or paying a bribe are further costs associated with 
detention.  
Pre-trial detention is therefore not only about a household losing a financial and non-financial 
contribution but also incurring new and unplanned-for expenses. Presumably, the longer detention 
continues, the higher the total of these expenses will be – until the family is forced to cease 
incurring these expenses in order to survive. Table 7 below provides more detail on these costs. 
The central point is that regardless of the charge, households incur costs due to the detention. 
Table 7 
 Travel cost Travel time Cash brought Food brought 
cost 
Kenya $2.76 90 min. $3.32 - 
Mozambique $1.27 120 min. $3.17 $3.27 
Zambia $17.00 90 min. $31.75 $11.90 
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6.3.10 More than a third of households had to borrow money 
The fact that more than a third of households surveyed had to borrow money is indicative of their 
marginalised status as well as the pervasive financial impact of pre-trial detention, regardless of 
the charges against the detainee. Substantial numbers of households had to borrow money in order 
to cover additional expenses and to make up for the loss in income. In Kenya 39 per cent of 
respondents said they had been forced to borrow from at least one lender, the most common being 
from friends (14 per cent), relatives (10 per cent) and Chama’s273 (informal financial co-operative) 
(nine per cent). Only three per cent borrowed from a bank or shylock274 (loan shark). The amounts 
ranged from US$4.43 to US$1106, with the median being US$33. For 65 per cent of respondents 
who borrowed money, the amount to be paid back equalled the amount borrowed. However, for 35 
per cent, interest ranging from 10 to 90 per cent was payable. Mozambican households surveyed 
reported that 34 per cent were forced to borrow money in order to make up for the shortfall caused 
by the detention. Some 19 per cent borrowed from a friend, some 10 per cent borrowed from a 
family member, while five per cent borrowed from an employer. The amount borrowed ranged 
from US$0.32 to US$475 with a median value of US$32. Loans were, however, interest free, 
except in one case. In Zambia more than a third (36 per cent) of households surveyed reported that 
they had to borrow money to make up for the loss of income, with the median amount being 
US$238, or more than double the median household income of US$111.  
6.3.11 Access to legal assistance is expensive 
It is less likely that persons charged with petty offences will be able to access state-funded legal 
assistance as this is more likely to be reserved for serious cases. The overall impression is that legal 
assistance is expensive and, for many, inaccessible. The extent to which detainees were able to 
access legal assistance varied greatly. In Kenya only 16 per cent of detainees said they had received 
some form of legal assistance, with female detainees being much less likely to have received legal 
assistance – only six per cent compared to 19 per cent of male detainees. This may be because of 
the difference in charges against them, as almost half (48 per cent) of those who had received legal 
assistance were charged with murder.  
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Those who did receive legal assistance received it from Legal Aid (39 per cent) and private lawyers 
(29 per cent). In Mozambique just over half (54 per cent) said they received legal assistance and 
76 per cent of those who received assistance said this was from the Instituto do Patrocínio e 
Assistência Jurídica (IPAJ), the state-funded legal aid institute. In Zambia, 26 per cent of detainees 
said they had received some form of legal assistance, but that legal assistance did not succeed in 
securing their release. Very little information was obtained about the cost of private legal 
assistance, but in Kenya this ranged from US$223 to US$3 337, and in Mozambique from US$64 
to US$792. Hiring a private attorney is simply not affordable to many detainees and their continued 
detention may thus be a direct result of their poverty, as a lawyer may indeed have been able to 
launch a successful application for their conditional release.275  
6.3.12 Bail is set at unaffordable amounts  
In many instances it appears that courts are punitive in setting bail amounts that are clearly 
unaffordable and thus ensure continued detention. This appears to be an overall trend, and the fact 
that bail was granted indicates that the charge was less serious and the accused not considered to 
be a major risk. 
In Kenya it was found that 65 per cent of detainees claimed they could not afford the bail amount 
set by the court. An assessment of these values does lend credence to a claim that bail is set at 
disproportionate amounts with the aim to make it unaffordable. Despite the fact that women are 
more commonly detained for theft than men, women reported unaffordable bail amounts in much 
higher frequency than men, 97 per cent versus 54 per cent. Unaffordable bail amounts alluded to 
by detainees ranged from US$77 to US$44 300 cash bail and US$55 370 bond. The most frequently 
mentioned amount was US$2 215, which applied to nearly one in five (17 per cent) of those who 
said they were still in detention because of the bail amount. The next most common amount was 
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US$1 107, which applied to 15 per cent of those who could not afford bail. The net result is that 
32 per cent of detainees who were granted bail were granted an amount that is more than the annual 
median income of detainees, US$960276 compared to US$1 107. 
The data for Mozambique are sketchy as only 20 per cent of male detainees interviewed had an 
amount for security recorded, which presumably they were unable to afford and thus remained in 
detention. The amounts ranged from US$319 to US$8 240, with a median of US$3 800. All of the 
amounts applied to theft or robbery charges. The minimum wage, the lowest of which applies to 
the agricultural sector, is MK37 200 per year (or US$1 140 at the time),277 which is also in line 
with median incomes earned by detainees. The security amounts are thus far in excess of median 
earnings and more than three times the annual minimum wage.  
7 The role of police or law enforcement officials in executing arrests for petty offences  
7.1 Petty offences are highly dependent on police discretion for arrest without a warrant 
and encourage police corruption and extortion 
It is important to set out some legal principles regarding arrest without a warrant, and South Africa 
is used as an example. There are various ways to secure the attendance of a suspect at trial; as arrest 
‘constitutes one of the most drastic infringements of the rights of an individual’, a police official 
should regard it as a measure of last resort.278  A further important issue is the definition of 
‘reasonable suspicion or grounds’ as the motivation for an arrest without a warrant.279 A police 
officer must really believe or suspect that the person had or is about to commit an offence; this 
belief or suspicion must be based on certain facts from which an inference or conclusion is drawn, 
which any reasonable person would in view of those facts would also draw.280  
As a general rule the purpose of an arrest is to secure the attendance of the suspect at his or her trial 
and not to ‘punish, scare or harass such person’.281 Although there may be variations between 
different jurisdictions, there are additions to this general rule, namely: arrest for the purposes of 
further investigation; arrest to verify the identity and address of the person; arrest to prevent the 
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commission of an offence; arrest in order to protect a suspect; and arrest in order to end an 
offence.282  
A key issue remains the discretion exercised by the arresting officer. In addition to the suspicion 
being reasonable, (a) the arrestor must have an open mind with regard to factors pointing to both 
innocence and guilt, (b) in the appropriate circumstances the suspect should have the opportunity 
to deal with allegations against him before being arrested, and (c) for the suspicion to be reasonable, 
it must extend to all the elements of the offence.283 Furthermore, when arresting without a warrant 
the arresting officer ‘would have to satisfy the court that he had considered and not merely paid lip 
service to, the rights of the suspect to human dignity and to freedom and had not relegated them to 
“a worthless level of subservience”’.284 In short, the arresting officer must think twice before 
making an arrest without a warrant.285 
The enforcement of certain petty offences is highly reliant on police discretion, including the 
offence of being a rogue and vagabond, loitering, breach of the peace, drunk in public, and drunk 
and disorderly. Individual police officers decide on the spot if a person’s behaviour is in breach of 
a law, such as a loitering law. Whether there are objective criteria for what constitutes, for example, 
loitering, is highly questionable. The Malawi Penal Code in section 184(1)(c) provides that  
[e]very person found in or near any premises or in any road or highway or any place adjacent 
thereto or in any public place, at such time and under such circumstances as to lead to the 
conclusion that such person is there for an illegal or disorderly purpose, shall be deemed a 
rogue and vagabond. 
It is this provision that is used to arrest people for so-called loitering and requires that a police 
officer must come ‘to the conclusion that such person is there for an illegal or disorderly purpose’. 
How the police officer will come to this conclusion is evidently open to interpretation, thus leaving 
it to the police officer to use his or her discretion. There is no victim or property involved as an 
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objective measure of a crime committed. These arrests are also executed without a warrant and 
there is thus no judicial review of the facts prior to the arrest. The situation invites stigma and 
societal stereotypes to play a role in criminalising people for who they are rather than for any 
particular criminal act. Having such broad discretion invites applying a stigmatic approach to 
persons with disabilities, for example, and may lead police officers to attribute a ‘disorderly 
purpose’ to someone whose only vice is looking non-typical, different or possibly ‘strange’. 
The broad definition of the offence, the authority of the police officer, coupled with the lack of 
oversight creates the ideal opportunity for corruption to take place. We can present this as a 
mathematical formula: corruption happens where an official holds the monopoly (to arrest) and has 
discretion to exercise that power, but where there is little or no accountability: 
 Corruption = (Monopoly + Discretion) - Accountability286 
To avoid arrest (and possible use of force), the police officer may then ask for a bribe. Bribes are 
also solicited for a variety reasons, such as to avoid paying a fine, to be granted police bail287 and 
to avoid arrest at all. This, of course, must be an affordable amount and thus amounts to petty 
corruption, which can be defined as follows: 
Small-scale, bureaucratic or petty corruption is the everyday corruption that takes 
place at the implementation end of politics, where the public officials meet the 
public. Petty corruption is bribery in connection with the implementation of existing 
laws, rules and regulations, and thus different from “grand” or political corruption. 
Petty corruption refers to the modest sums of money usually involved, and has also 
been called “low level” and “street level” to name the kind of corruption that people 
can experience, more or less, daily, in their encounter with public administration 
and services like hospitals, schools, local licensing authorities, police, taxing 
authorities, and so on.288  
The pervasive influence of even the smallest acts of corruption should not be underestimated. All 
acts of corruption are serious because ‘they lead to the establishment of patterns of undesirable 
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behaviour, patterns that cannot be undone easily, and which thereby lower the ethical standards 
within a society however incrementally’.289 
The scale of petty corruption is not insubstantial. The 2013 South African Victims of Crime Survey 
found that 4.5 per cent of households surveyed had to pay cash, give a gift or do a favour in 
exchange for a service that a government official was required by law to perform. Of this group, 
50 per cent paid a bribe to a traffic officer and 23 per cent to the police.290 While proportions seem 
low, the potential monetary value involved may be substantial. A 2002 report by Transparency 
International found that on average each Kenyan had been forced to bribe the police four and a half 
times a month, paying them on average US$16 per month, and 95 per cent of interactions with the 
police resulted in a bribe.291 Nicknames used for the police are equally informative:  
the traffic police in Kenya are called TKK – Toa kitu kidogo – Swahili for “give something 
small”; in Ghana, police are often chided as “koti”292 because of their tendency to harass the 
public; . . . in Cameroon police are referred to as “Mange-milles” – thousand eaters – in 
reference to the customary bribe of 1000 CfA.293  
Highly discretionary offences coupled with weak governance in a police force create an ideal 
environment for extortion and other forms of corruption targeting the poor and powerless in 
society.  
7.2 High levels of violence are associated with law enforcement, even for petty offences.  
Across the continent high levels of violence are associated with law enforcement, and various 
sources 294  lament the use of excessive force during arrests and public protests. Few African 
countries keep reliable statistics, if at all, on complaints regarding excessive use of force by the 
police during arrest. Such figures are, however, available for South Africa, where the police 
oversight structure, the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID),295 records significant 
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numbers every year, as shown in Figure 1.296 While it is unknown what the reasons for the arrest 
were (that is, a serious or petty offence), the overall trend is that a substantial number of people 
reported the police’s abusive conduct to IPID. There is also in all likelihood a severe under-
reporting of such complaints for fear of reprisal, given that many poor and marginalised persons 




A 2012 report on compliance with the Southern African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation 
(SARPCCO) Code of Conduct covers ten SADC member countries, 297  and for all countries 
surveyed there were reports of excessive use of force by the police during arrests.298 There is 
increasing evidence that the levels of abuse perpetrated against the poor have escalated. For 
example: 
• A report by the Independent Medical Legal Unit (IMLU) issued in 2014 showed that 
police shootings account for the bulk of injuries inflicted on hawkers and small-scale 
business operators in Nairobi, Kenya. The report also notes extensive beatings, 
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threats and extortion perpetrated by askaris (municipal by-law enforcement officers) 
against street traders.299 
• Reports issued by the UN and Human Rights Watch in 2014 documented how ill-
conceived crime prevention efforts resulted in summary killings of unarmed men and 
boys in the Democratic Republic of Congo.300 
• A report issued by Human Rights Watch in 2014 documented the range of abuses 
faced by street children in Uganda at the hands of police under the guise of enforcing 
vagrancy laws.301 
• A report issued by Human Rights Watch in 2013 documented police abuse of street 
vendors in Angola. Since 2012, following a provincial government decision, ‘the 
police and government inspectors (known as fiscais) have increasingly conducted 
joint operations against street traders throughout Luanda, frequently beating street 
traders, including pregnant women and women with babies on their back. Police and 
fiscais also routinely seize goods, extort bribes, threaten to detain, and in some cases 
arrest street vendors during the roundups.’302 
Under international law all states are obliged to condemn torture and extra-judicial killings. 
Moreover, all states are obliged to investigate such cases and hold perpetrators accountable. This 
would require legislative reform, where needed, the establishment of effective oversight 
mechanisms and the appropriate training of law enforcement officials. 
7.3 High volumes of arrests for petty offences are severely detrimental to police-community 
relations  
The AChHPR states that every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent 
in a human being and prohibits all forms of exploitation and degradation of man, particularly 
slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment.303 Human 
dignity is an inherent basic right to which all human beings are entitled without discrimination.304 
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The ACHPR stresses that inhuman and degrading treatment includes not only actions that cause 
serious physical or psychological suffering, but those which humiliate or force the individual 
against his will or conscience.305 The arbitrary confrontation by the police and the unlawful arrest 
of an individual is a demeaning and humiliating experience. This is even more demeaning if it is 
for minor offences, which are not a threat to public safety and which target vulnerable and poor 
people and people with disabilities for behaviour which is not criminal.  
Constructive police-community relations are highly dependent on mutual respect and policing 
methods that remain within the bounds of the law and human rights standards. Ross describes good 
versus poor community-police relations as follows.306 Good police-community relations bring a 
number of advantages, such as the police having a better understanding of the public’s concerns, 
people being more inclined to report crimes and give information and intelligence to the police, 
people being more likely to appear as witnesses in trials. This enables the police to be more 
proactive in preventing crimes or at least minimising their impact. When there are poor police-
community relations, the police are out of touch with community needs, problems, goals and 
desires, and are perceived as an occupying force that does more harm than good. In such situations 
they become more reactive. All indications are that the harsh and abusive enforcement of petty 
offence laws is detrimental to police-community relations. 
The authoritative Sherman report notes that research findings are inconclusive in respect of 
proactive arrest rates, observing that in some instances it appears to have an impact on crime rates 
but in other situations not.307 Targeting high-risk offenders appears to be promising. 
The Khayelitsha Commission (South Africa) was established to investigate the breakdown of 
police-community relations in Khayelitsha township, a large settlement east of Cape Town. The 
Commission found that many reasons contributed to poor police-community relations, many of 
which fed a sense of fear, distrust and antagonism.308 One of these was that people were frequently 
arrested without there being sufficient evidence:  
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[T]here are many arrests for minor offences, such as riotous behaviour, at the Lingelethu 
West station [a police station in Khayelitsha] where detainees are locked up overnight and 
then released the following morning on a J534 (payment of an admission of guilt fine).309  
Moreover, the Commission heard that the police had arrest targets for certain offences, the 
implication of which that the police would arrest large numbers of people in the hope that they may 
find something.310 Yet this had very little if any impact on the crime rate and perceptions of safety, 
and contributed to the breakdown of police-community relations. 
Sweeping operations, or crackdowns, are often used by the police to demonstrate that something is 
being done about crime or to address particular problem areas, resulting in high numbers of arrests, 
many for petty offences. Petty offence enforcement is a handy tool for arresting high numbers of 
people. Research done in Malawi made a number of important observations regarding sweeping 
operations conducted by the police which have a potentially negative impact on police-community 
relations: 
Such exercises are often conducted as a learning tool for young police recruits, a strategy 
with the potential of producing unnecessary arrests for training purposes. Police stations must 
develop clear criteria and objectives for arrests during sweeping exercises. Typically, 
sweeping exercises have only very general objectives, meaning that persons are arrested, for 
example, for being on the street at night, even when they have not committed a specific 
offence or engaged in suspicious activity. There is no overarching policy on sweeping 
exercises, a fact that accordingly gives police relative freedom to arrest persons without 
having to follow procedures or conduct thorough investigations.311 
The literature also raises a number of other concerns about sweeping or crackdown operations.312 
If there is any impact, it is of short duration because crackdowns do not address the underlying 
physical and socioeconomic conditions responsible for crime. Crackdowns may, however, have a 
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positive impact when done for a very specific purpose to bring short-term relief. These operations 
can result in displacement, that is, a problem is displaced from one area to another. Improperly 
conducted crackdowns can be negative for police-community relations and, at least in the US, have 
resulted in widespread public protests against the police. The more militarised in style and 
appearance a crackdown is, the more likely that it will instil fear in citizens, which erodes trust and 
respect. However, if the purpose and aims of the crackdown are properly communicated, loss of 
public confidence is not inevitable. Poorly planned and poorly supervised crackdowns 
accompanied by pressure to make arrests and confiscate contraband increase the risk of abuse and 
rights violations. Crackdown requires large numbers of police officers and this increases costs, 
especially when overtime must be paid over a sustained period. Costs also increase for registering 
arrest and booking detainees. Crackdowns result in additional pressure on prosecutors, courts and 
magistrates, who may in turn manage the sudden increased caseload by asking for light sentences 
or choosing not to prosecute. Lastly, crackdowns result in resources being withdrawn from other 
areas and concentrated in one area, which may have negative consequences for the other areas.  
High volumes of arrest and crackdowns on petty offences do not, in general, build confidence and 
trust in the police, nor contribute to sustained public safety. The opposite seems to be true – it 
alienates the public and brings about a sense of fear and mistrust. 
8 Conclusion 
The main arguments for the decriminalisation and declassification of petty offences centre on four 
issues: (1) The offences are almost without fail defined in a broad and vague manner, leaving them 
open to interpretation and thus abuse by law enforcement officials. (2) The punishments that these 
offences attract are disproportionate to the potential harm that was caused. Imprisonment of up to 
one year for an offence such as loitering is indicative of a vindictive penal code inherited from the 
colonial powers and perpetuated by governments that have not transformed their criminal justice 
systems to reflect the AChHPR and acknowledge the socioeconomic realities of Africa. (3) The 
enforcement of these offences is frequently discriminatory in nature, targeting individuals because 
they are poor, homeless, belong to an out-group or merely trying to earn a living in contravention 
of an outdated or overly restrictive law. (4) The enforcement of these laws is frequently done in an 
arbitrary and erratic manner through sweeping operations, but also tainted by corruption and 




bribery. Arrest and detention result in severe socioeconomic consequences for detainees and their 
households. 
This report has argued that the majority of people arrested for petty offences are poor, marginalised, 
powerless and vulnerable. They are often the first victims of police violence, because their 
vulnerability and poverty do not allow them to defend themselves and demand their rights. The 
problem is enabled by, on the one hand, myriad seemingly antiquated laws, municipal by-laws and 
petty offences, and on the other hand, notions of social order that have their roots in the colonial 
era.313 The Preamble to the AChHPR states that ‘freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential 
objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples’. Petty offence 
laws, which emanate from the colonial past, remain on the statutes of many African states despite 
the pledge made in article 2 of the Charter, to ‘eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa, to 
coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of 
Africa’. 314  The arbitrary and unlawful arrest for outdated, discriminatory and petty offences, 
targeting the most vulnerable persons, violates fundamental rights as enshrined in the AChHPR 
and supported by the Ouagadougou Declaration and the Luanda Guidelines.  
The AChHPR provides everyone the right to equality and equal protection before the law315 and 
non-discrimination on grounds of any kind, including race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status.316 
State Parties to the AChHPR have an obligation to ensure the elimination of discrimination against 
women, and protection of the rights of woman and children.317 The aged and the disabled shall also 
have the right to reasonable accommodation, supported by the applicable procedural and 
substantial safeguard.318 The enforcement of petty offences (particularly those that are vague or 
over-broad) that allows police the wide discretion to execute arrests, has the risk of officials using 
their arrest powers to assume criminality on the basis of economic disparity, poverty, gender, race, 
ethnicity and place of origin. This denies certain categories of persons the right to equality before 
the law. Such arrests also violate the right not to be discriminated against, as it gives law 
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enforcement officials the opportunity to target specific categories of persons such as street children, 
females and poor people who have no place to stay or street vendors who are trying to earn a living 
to feed their families. Arrests are executed because such individuals are considered ‘undesirable’ 
in the eyes of law enforcement officials and/or such arrests enjoy support from other citizens who 
do not face such challenges. 
In view of the above, it is necessary that states across the continent embark on law reform and law 
enforcement reform processes to ensure that trivial and outdated offences are decriminalised and, 
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